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INTRODUCTION 
It is telling, but perhaps unsurprising that the legal and 
regulatory structures that helped cause the subprime mortgage 
crisis are also making it more difficult to address the resulting 
flood of mortgage defaults and foreclosures.  Securitization 
lowered underwriting standards by allowing mortgage lenders to 
sell poorly underwritten loans, leaving investors to deal with the 
ensuing defaults.  Securitization also is making it more difficult 
to resolve these problem loans, as they were stranded in 
securitized loan pools, and their resolution is often stymied by 
servicers’ self-interest and unwillingness to spend the resources 
to modify the loans.  Similarly, the deregulatory fever which 
swept Washington during the Bush Administration made it 
easier for lenders to reduce their underwriting standards without 
adequately informing investors.1  As foreclosures mounted and 
servicers responded with robo-signing of foreclosure documents 
and other abusive practices, regulators seemed almost mystified 
as to who regulated mortgage servicers and how servicers should 
be regulated.  When Congress passed the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), there was so little expertise in 
regulating servicers among the federal agencies that the job of 
overseeing HAMP was passed to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
who have proven largely unable, and to a great extent even 
unwilling to rein in servicer misconduct.2  And so deregulation 
not only led to the creation of risky loans, it hampered the ability 
of the federal government to create effective programs to reduce 
the harm caused by those loans to borrowers, investors, and the 
public. 
A third cause of the mortgage meltdown that has also 
interfered with cleaning up the resulting foreclosure crisis is 
federal preemption of state laws.  During the subprime boom 
ending in 2007, federal banking agencies insisted that their 
regulations preempted the state initiatives that could have 
slowed predatory lending and the creation of risky home loans.  
States attempted to curb predatory lending through a variety of 
state laws.3  In response, the federally regulated banking 
 
 1 For a discussion of how securitization allowed lenders to reduce underwriting 
standards without adequate disclosure to investors, see Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: 
How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009). 
 2 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT  
REPORT 82 (2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010243/ 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf. 
 3 For a discussion of the various state statutes directed at halting such predatory 
lending, see Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach 
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industry sought protection from state regulation by requesting 
that federal regulators determine that those state laws were 
preempted and so could be ignored by federally regulated banks 
and thrifts.  Not coincidentally, federally regulated banks and 
thrifts have seen higher default rates in their mortgages than 
state regulated banks and thrifts, with lenders regulated by the 
federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) among the worst 
offenders.  Moreover, states were tempted to loosen their own 
regulations, or face losing their state banks to a more permissive 
federal charter. 
Just as preemption by federal regulatory agencies helped 
cause the mortgage meltdown, preemption has been a barrier to 
state efforts to address the meltdown.  Mortgage servicers that 
are federally regulated banks or their subsidiaries have claimed 
that they are free from state regulation, whether in the form of 
state regulators seeking to examine their practices, or state laws 
and regulations aimed at inducing servicers to modify loans 
where appropriate.4  Instead, these mortgage servicers have 
regularly argued that only federal regulation applies to them.  
Federal regulation of servicers has been weak and sparse, with 
few carrots and almost no sticks, and federal regulators have 
until recently had an almost entirely hands-off attitude toward 
the servicers.  As a result, federally-regulated servicers have 
engaged in significant misbehavior, including the infamous 
“robo-signing” scandals, where servicer employees were certifying 
the debt and defaults for borrowers in notarized statements 
without personal knowledge of those debts or whether borrowers 
were even in default.5  On too many occasions, servicers have 
attempted to foreclose on homes even when it appears that 
neither they nor the trust they represent possess the note that 
would allow such foreclosure.6  And servicers have regularly piled 
excessive or unfounded fees on borrowers, at times pushing 
borrowers into foreclosure with such fees alone. 
At the same time, servicers have failed to modify loans 
where appropriate, and have foreclosed even when a loan 
modification might have been best for both the borrower and the 
investors that hold the loans.  By attempting to shield 
 
to Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 451–53 
(2005). 
 4 See infra, Section VI. 
 5 See Lorraine Woellert, ‘Robo-signing’ Penalties Expected Soon, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 24, 2011, at 11. 
 6 See Gretchen Morgenson, Guess What Got Lost in the Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2009, at BU1. 
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themselves with preemption from state regulation, and through 
the dearth of effective federal regulation, mortgage servicers 
have been acting as a law unto themselves, to the detriment of 
both the borrowers they collect from and the investors whom they 
are supposed to serve. 
While there is only limited information regarding the 
servicing practices of non-federally regulated servicers, it 
appears that state community banks have avoided at least the 
worst practices of federally-regulated servicers so far.  When the 
FDIC examined these state-regulated servicers, it did not find 
evidence of robo-signing or any other serious problems that have 
appeared industry-wide or that would warrant the FDIC taking 
formal enforcement action against these much smaller servicers.7  
Furthermore, a recent Treasury Department analysis of 
mortgage servicers revealed that the three worst offenders were 
all national banks. 
The new Dodd-Frank Act was drafted with recognition of the 
abuses of preemption in the mortgage industry.  The Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010, which is Title X of Dodd-Frank, 
calls for a rollback of preemption and for greater state action to 
prevent future servicing abuses by federally regulated banks and 
thrifts.8  The exact contours of this new law of preemption in the 
banking industry are not clear because Dodd-Frank leaves much 
of its specific effects to regulations not yet drafted by the 
respective federal agencies.  Moreover, the OTS will disappear 
and be subsumed into the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC).  A new regulator will appear—the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—beginning in July, 2011, 
with the inevitable lag time in any regulations it might enact.9  
With the creation of the CFPB, new turf battles may arise, with 
the OCC and the CFPB battling to provide mortgage servicer 
regulations that may defend consumers against banks, or vice-
versa. 
 
 7 See Carrie Bay, FDIC Releases Report Detailing Findings of Foreclosure 
Investigation, DSNEWS (May 4, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/fdic-releases-
report-detailing-findings-of-foreclosure-investigation-2011-05-04 (explaining that in a 
2011 FDIC report, the FDIC has to date failed to uncover any evidence of ‘robo-signing’ or 
other problems with state non-member banks which would call for disciplinary action to 
be taken). 
 8 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 9 Lewis S. Wiener & Evan J. Taylor, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
SUTHERLAND (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/cce089c9-6087-4cf6-
9b87-0094eef8b957/Presentation/NewsAttachment/d7939b30-458d-4ccf-bda2-
e3db48c38a97/ACC Financial Services - CFPB Legal Alert - March 2011.pdf. 
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Federal agencies have, after what appears to be a pro forma 
investigation of mortgage abuses, issued a report admitting the 
existence of those abuses and outlined a plan to correct them.  
However, the plan appears at first blush to be a weak one, with 
mortgage servicers ordered to correct their own policies and 
procedures and internal controls, and to hire their own monitor, 
with the approval of federal regulators, and then report back 
with what they have done.10  The federal regulators appear to be 
punting the regulation of mortgage servicers to outside firms 
chosen and hired by the servicers themselves. 
This article is an attempt to show what went wrong in the 
previous regulation of mortgage servicing (or lack thereof), and to 
map the new preemption terrain for mortgage servicing, 
providing some guideposts on what the new post-Dodd-Frank 
preemption landscape will look like and where the boundaries for 
state action might lie.  States should not wait for the federal 
agencies to act.  Instead, states should move now to regulate 
mortgage servicers to deter the abuses servicers have been 
committing and to encourage appropriate loan modifications that 
benefit both borrower and investor alike.  With the new rules of 
preemption, states should step boldly into what, even with recent 
federal action, mostly still is a void: the regulation of mortgage 
servicing. 
I.  THE FAILURES OF MORTGAGE SERVICING 
Though the abuses and failures of mortgage servicers have 
long been detailed,11 it was as if they were discovered anew, first 
by Congress and the news media, and then belatedly by federal 
regulators in the fall of 2010.  The many failures of mortgage 
servicers suddenly became a hot topic, both in Congress and in 
the news.12  Journalists reported nationwide evidence of “robo-
 
 10 See Regulatory Actions Related to Foreclosure Activities by Large Servicers and 
Practical Implications for Community Banks, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
examinations/supervisory/insights/sise11/foreclosure.html (last visited May 19, 2011). 
 11 See generally Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage 
Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753, 753–84 (2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095 (discussing abusive behavior of residential mortgage 
servicers towards borrowers). 
 12 Congress has defined a “servicer” as “the person responsible for servicing of a loan 
(including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).” 12 
U.S.C.A. § 2605(i)(2) (2011).  On the other hand, “servicing” is “receiving any scheduled 
periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan . . . and making the 
payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts 
received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the loan.” 12 
U.S.C.A. § 2605(i)(3) (2011). 
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signing,” by mortgage servicers seeking to foreclose on homes.13  
One court has defined a “robo-signer” as “a person who quickly 
signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a 
month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed 
the mortgage documents and has not done so.”14  One bank 
admitted to false attestations on 55,000 affidavits.15  A bank 
employee who said that she signed up to 8000 affidavits and 
other foreclosure-related documents a month admitted that she 
normally did not read any of them.16  Another servicer employee, 
this one a supervisor in charge of signing affidavits, stated that 
she did not know what conditions justified foreclosure, that she 
could not even define the meaning of necessary terms like 
“promissory note,” and stated, “I don’t know the ins and outs of 
the loan, I just sign documents.”17  The practice of robo-signing 
appeared so wide-spread that many of the nation’s largest 
mortgage servicers declared moratoriums on foreclosures, either 
nationally or at least in states that require judicial foreclosure 
while they investigated their own practices.18 
Robo-signing constitutes fraud on the court if the resulting 
affidavits are submitted as evidence.  By using robo-signers, 
banks and servicers can foreclose on borrowers while hiding from 
courts the flaws or gaps in their loan records regarding mortgage 
payments or loan modifications, or concealing whether they are 
missing the loan documents demonstrating whether they even 
have the right to foreclose.  Sadly, servicers have found that some 
attorneys have been all too willing to play “hide the ball” with 
courts to obtain foreclosure orders without valid evidence.  In one 
case, a court noted that the legal representation of servicers in 
foreclosure actions had devolved into a “corrosive ‘assembly line’ 
culture of practicing law” and wondered “what kind of culture 
 
 13 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Banks’ Flawed Paperwork Throws Some 
Foreclosures Into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A1; David Streitfeld, 3rd Lender Will 
Freeze Foreclosures in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B1. 
 14 Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2010).  In 
Drayton the court dismissed a foreclosure action without prejudice upon request of 
plaintiff, with the court noting that the case involved a servicer employee who, in a 
deposition in another action, had “admitted that she: is a ‘robo-signer’ who executes about 
750 mortgage documents a week, without a notary public present; does not spend more 
than 30 seconds signing each document; [and] does not read the documents before signing 
them . . . .” Id. 
 15 Jeff Horwitz, Wells Joins Robo Club, in its Way, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 2010, at 1. 
 16 Jenifer B. McKim, Lenders on Autopilot: Using Robo-Signers to Process Thousands 
of Foreclosures Opens Banks Up to Legal Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2010, at 7. 
 17 Michelle Conlin, Robo-Signers: Mortgage Experience Not Necessary, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Oct. 12, 2010. 
 18 Nelson D. Schwartz, Foreclosures Had Errors, Bank Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2010, at B1. 
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condones its lawyers lying to the court and then retreating to the 
office hoping that the Court will forget about the whole 
matter?”19  The Florida Attorney General’s office has been 
investigating claims that foreclosure attorneys in that state have 
been “fabricating and/or presenting false and misleading 
documents in foreclosure cases,” and reached a $2 million 
settlement with one prominent firm based on such claims.20  
Even foreclosure attorneys who otherwise might attempt to 
follow the rules of court are at times being pushed by their 
servicer clients to engage in mindless, automated court filings, 
unable to verify if the information contained in their filings is 
even true because the attorneys are being directed solely by 
computer software that spits out what documents and claims to 
file.  One court found that a bank servicing its own loans used 
mortgage servicing software that  
manages, without human interaction, the relationship between [the 
bank] and its attorneys in the collection of delinquent mortgage loans 
through automated responses to certain queues” and that the software 
program “is the mortgage banking industry’s most widely used 
servicing system with more than 50% of all mortgages in the United 
States serviced on it.21   
The court seemed astounded to learn that the “entire process 
occurs without any communication between counsel and the 
client and for the most part, without any legal judgment by an 
attorney.”22  
Some argue that a larger problem for mortgage servicers is 
that often neither they nor the trusts for which they work 
actually hold some of the notes on which they are attempting to 
foreclose.23  There is significant anecdotal evidence that, on a 
wide scale basis, notes were not validly transferred to the trusts 
for which servicers work.24 
 
 19 In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138, 183–84 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 20 David McLaughlin, Florida Settles with Law Firm in Foreclosure Investigation, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-25/florida-law-
firm-to-pay-2-million-over-state-foreclosure-investigation.html. 
 21 In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 624 & n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 22 Id. at 637. 
 23 Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, In Foreclosure Controversy, Problems Run 
Deeper than Flawed Paperwork, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/06/ 
AR2010100607227.html?sid=ST2010100607251. 
 24 See Morgenson, supra note 6, at BU1.  See also Dale A. Whitman, How 
Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, And What to Do About It, 
37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 758 (2010) (“While delivery of the note might seem a simple matter 
of compliance, experience during the past several years has shown that, probably in 
countless thousands of cases, promissory notes were never delivered to secondary market 
investors or securitizers, and, in many cases, cannot presently be located at all.  The issue 
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Consumer advocates complain that robo-signing is just the 
tip of the iceberg, and that servicers mistreat borrowers much 
more broadly by charging excessive or inappropriate fees, forcing 
borrowers to purchase high-cost insurance even though they 
already have insurance in place, and foreclosing without good 
cause or when both borrowers and the investors who own the 
loan would benefit from the borrower obtaining a loan 
modification.25  Mortgage servicers can profit greatly from late 
fees and other charges when borrowers are in default, and 
industry insiders and other critics have long charged that 
mortgage servicers withhold some loan modifications that might 
help investors and borrowers alike so that the servicers can 
collect greater fees.26  Another reason servicers have been slow to 
modify loans is that loan modification is a labor-intensive 
process, requiring the servicer in essence to re-underwrite the 
loan to determine how much the borrower can afford.27  By hiring 
too little staff to engage in the many appropriate loan 
modifications requested, servicers can save large sums, as much 
as $20 billion by one leaked confidential estimate.28  The 
existence and nature of loan modifications is a crucial 
determinant in whether borrowers who go into default are able to 
save their homes from foreclosure.29  However, the pace of loan 
 
is extremely widespread, and, in many cases, appears to have been the result of a 
conscious policy on the part of mortgage sellers to retain, rather than transfer, the notes 
representing the loans they were selling.”). 
 25 See Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing 
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1–5 (2010) 
(testimony of Diane E. Thompson, National Consumer Law Center), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View& 
FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9.  See also Robo-Signing, Chain of 
Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearings Before the H. 
Fin. Servs. Comm., Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 15 (2010) 
(testimony of Prof. Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/ 
Levitin111810.pdf; HAMP, Servicer Abuses, and Foreclosure Prevention Strategies: 
Hearings Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2010) (testimony of Julia 
Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/ 
testimony-102710-gordon.pdfhttp://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710-
gordon.pdf. 
 26 Peter S. Goodman, Late-Fee Profits May Trump Plan to Modify Loans, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 2009, at A1. 
 27 See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is 
Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan 
Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 285 (2007). 
 28 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PERSPECTIVES ON SETTLEMENT ALTERNATIVE 
IN MORTGAGE SERVICING (2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/ 
big-banks-save-billions-homeowners-suffer_n_841712.html. 
 29 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Market-Based Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled 
Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis 5 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2010-
03-019, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690627 (“In particular, greater 
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modifications has been glacial, with a recent report that “80% of 
all non-performing private-label mortgages have not been 
modified after twelve months.”30  Securitized loans in default are 
significantly less likely to be modified than loans held in portfolio 
by a financial institution, showing that servicers are not 
modifying loans as they would if they owned the loans 
themselves.31  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently 
obtained a settlement for $108 million from two servicer units of 
Countrywide, now owned by Bank of America.  The FTC 
chairman noted that Countrywide had marked up some fees 
more than 400% and stated that “[t]he record-keeping of 
Countrywide was abysmal. . . .  Most frat houses have better 
record-keeping than Countrywide.”32 
Worse yet, this pattern of abusive behavior, along with an 
inadequate federal response, is not new, as even early in the last 
decade, servicers had perfected the art of using unfair practices 
to squeeze fees out of borrowers.33  For years, courts have found 
that servicers attempted to foreclose even when it appears that 
no foreclosure was justified.  In the 2002 case, In re Gorshtein, 
the court sanctioned servicers who falsely claimed borrowers 
were in default, saying that its decision was “provoked by an 
apparently increasing number of motions in this Court to vacate 
the automatic stay filed by secured creditors often based upon 
attorney affidavits certifying material post-petition defaults 
where, in fact, there were no material defaults by the debtors.”34 
Sadly, such cases continue unabated.  In August 2010, a 
court noted how a servicer, through a combination of 
 
reductions in loan interest rates (or monthly payments) are associated with sizable 
declines in redefault rates.  As an illustration, a reduction of 1% point in the interest rate 
is associated with a 3.9% point drop in six-month redefault rate.”). 
 30 See Brian Collins, It’s Hard Out There for a Mortgage Servicer..., MORTGAGE 
SERVICING NEWS, Jan. 2011, at 6 (citing data from the Amherst Securities Group). 
 31 Sumit Agarwal, et al., The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation 1–4 
(Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2011-2, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739915.  The authors argue “that the rate of loan modification, 
which constitutes the lion’s share (over 75%) of private renegotiation actions, is also 
significantly higher for portfolio loans.  Specifically, portfolio-held loans are 4.2 to 5.8 
percentage points (34% to 51% in relative terms) more likely to be modified.” Id. at 4. 
 32 Corbett B. Daly, B of A’s Countrywide Settles with FTC for $108 Million, REUTERS 
(June 7, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/07/us-countrywide-ftc-
idUSTRE6563DT20100607. 
 33 Fairbanks Capital was likely the most notorious mortgage servicer in the years 
following the turn of the century, and settled an action with the Federal Trade 
Commission for $40 million.  For a discussion of the Fairbanks matter and further 
evidence of servicing abuse in the era before the mortgage meltdown, see Kurt Eggert, 
Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753, 
761–67 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095. 
 34 In re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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inappropriate fees and the servicer’s own incompetence, 
attempted to foreclose on two borrowers who had paid their loan 
like “clockwork.”35  The court stated that the servicer’s conduct 
represents the most callous and egregious effort to collect an 
indebtedness that was never owed that this court has been called 
upon to review.  Succinctly stated, [the servicer’s] incompetent 
servicing tactics converted a loan transaction that was being paid like 
‘clockwork’ to a loan that was virtually impossible to pay, particularly 
for modest income borrowers.36 
A study of servicer claims in bankruptcy court found that 
“[a] majority of mortgage companies’ proofs of claim lack the 
documentation necessary to establish a valid debt.  Fees and 
charges on bankruptcy claims often are identified poorly and 
sometimes do not appear to be legally permissible.”37  These are 
filings in bankruptcy court, where a servicer is perhaps most 
likely to dot i’s and cross t’s, given the bankruptcy court’s 
oversight.  A recent survey of consumer attorneys indicates that 
a large percentage of the borrowers they represent have had 
foreclosure proceedings initiated either due to “improper fees or 
payment processing” or while the borrower is “awaiting a loan 
modification.”38  The U.S. Trustee’s office has been investigating 
bankruptcy filings by mortgage servicers and has reportedly 
discovered error rates among those filings that “might be ten 
times higher” than the one percent error rate claimed by 
mortgage servicers in Senate testimony.39  One servicer/bank 
claimed the borrower owed over $50,000, but when the trustee 
“asked for documentation, the amount dropped to $3,156.”40  
According to the U.S. Trustee director, the flaws in the servicers’ 
processes “undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system.  
Many homeowners have been harmed,” by such bad practices as 
submitting inaccurate statements or attempting to foreclose even 
 
 35 In re Cothern, 442 B.R. 494, 496–97, 499 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010). 
 36 Id. at 499.  In Cothern, the servicer first wrongly concluded that the borrowers’ 
house was uninsured and so bought force-placed insurance. Id. at 496–97.  Even when it 
realized its mistake, the servicer placed the borrowers’ payments into a suspense account 
rather than fixing the problem and in the end tried to collect fees totaling roughly 
$15,000, made up of attorney’s fees, foreclosure fees, and other charges.  The court stated 
that “[t]here is no doubt that the unrelenting actions of [the servicer] drove the Cotherns 
into bankruptcy.” Id. at 499. 
 37 Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 124 (2008). 
 38 Servicers Continue to Wrongfully Initiate Foreclosures, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER 
ADVOCS. & THE NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.naca.net/_assets/ 
shared/634280136429845000.pdf. 
 39 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Low Bid for Fixing a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2011, at BU1, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/business/15gret.html. 
 40 Id. 
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when borrowers are making proper payments on trial loan 
modifications.41 
Faced with widespread evidence of servicer malfeasance, 
fifty state Attorneys General banded together to investigate the 
robo-signing problem and then expanded this investigation to 
include problems in the servicing industry more generally.42  
Federal banking regulators, long too silent and passive regarding 
mortgage servicing, responded by asking servicers “to conduct 
self-assessments of their foreclosure management processes and 
correct any deficiencies,” but also began their own investigation 
of mortgage servicers.43  They have reported significant problems 
in the servicing industry, noting “critical deficiencies and 
shortcomings in foreclosure governance processes, foreclosure 
document preparation processes, and oversight and monitoring of 
third party law firms and vendors” which resulted in “violations 
of state and local foreclosure laws . . . and have had an adverse 
affect [sic] on the functioning of the mortgage markets and the 
U.S. economy as a whole.”44 
The federal interagency review of the fourteen top servicers 
included eight national banks regulated by the OCC, four thrifts 
regulated by the OTS, and two other financial institutions 
regulated by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors.45  The 
reviewers found “widespread unsafe or unsound operational 
practices, including missing documents, execution of documents 
by unauthorized persons, failure to notarize documents in 
accordance with local law, inaccurate affidavits, and affidavits 
signed by persons lacking sufficient knowledge of the underlying 
mortgage loan transactions.”46  The review demonstrated that 
federal regulators had woefully failed to deter misconduct by 
mortgage servicers.   
 
 41 Id. 
 42 See, e.g., Miller Says Foreclosure Investigation is Broad-Based, DES MOINES 
SUNDAY REG., Dec. 12, 2010, at 1D. 
 43 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-433, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: 
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 25 
(2011) [hereinafter GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11433.pdf. 
 44 Testimony of John Walsh Acting Comptroller of the Currency: Hearings Before the 
U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 15 (2011), (testimony 
of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
news-issuances/congressional-testimony/2011/pub-test-2011-19-written.pdf. 
 45 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REGULATORY ACTIONS RELATED TO FORECLOSURE 
ACTIVITIES BY LARGE SERVICERS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY BANKS 3 
(2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/ 
sise11/SI_SE2011.pdf. 
 46 Id. at 4. 
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A recent report by the Treasury Department confirms that 
large national banks are the worst offenders when it comes to 
mortgage servicing.  Of the mortgage servicers featured in the 
report, only three will have their servicer incentives withheld, 
because they needed substantial improvement and had no 
mitigating factors sufficient to justify the disbursement of those 
payments.47  All three are the servicing arms of national banks 
regulated by the OCC.48 
By comparison, the FDIC’s investigation found much better 
behavior by state-supervised servicers.  The FDIC investigated 
state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System 
to see if they engaged in “robo-signing” or the other deficient 
practices found by the interagency review of the fourteen largest 
federally regulated servicers.  The FDIC reported that it did not 
find “serious industry wide problems among state nonmember 
banks,” and that “[t]o date, the review has not identified ‘robo-
signing’ or any other deficiencies that would warrant formal 
enforcement actions.”49  In other words, the most egregious 
servicer problems seem concentrated among federally rather 
than state-regulated mortgage servicers. 
While the states’ Attorneys General and federal agencies 
report that they are finding significant evidence of widespread 
servicer misconduct, they appear to disagree on what 
punishment mortgage servicers should receive for their 
misconduct.  The regulatory agency most concerned with 
consumer protection, the “newly created Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau[,] is pushing for $20 billion or more in 
penalties, backed up by the attorneys general and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . .”50  The traditional federal 
bank regulators, the OCC, and the Federal Reserve Board, 
reportedly claim that few borrowers were victims of wrongful 
foreclosures, and so the fines should be much smaller.51  And so it 
is possible that even after this apparently widespread misconduct 
by servicers, they may receive the proverbial slap on the wrist. 
 
 47 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE REPORT AND 
SERVICER ASSESSMENTS FOR FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-
Reports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 5–6. 
 50 Nelson D. Schwartz & David Streitfeld, Officials Disagree on Penalties for 
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at B1. 
 51 Id. at B1. 
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In the midst of this servicer misconduct, the mortgage crisis 
continues.  One Federal Reserve governor recently noted that 
foreclosures had rocketed from about one million in 2006 to 2.8 
million in 2009, estimated that the final tallies in 2010 would be 
about 2.25 million foreclosures, and predicted another two 
million in 2012, with foreclosure levels thereafter expected to 
“remain extremely high by historical standards.”52  Roughly a 
third of the approximately two million homes that were in 
foreclosure sit vacant.53  As of the end of 2010, “almost 5 million 
mortgage loans [were] 90 days or more past due or in 
foreclosure.”54  Adding to the foreclosure risk are the number of 
American homeowners with negative equity in their homes, with 
an estimated 15.7 million homeowners “underwater” at the end 
of 2010, up nearly two million from just three months before and 
representing twenty-seven percent of all single-family dwellings 
with a mortgage.55  While foreclosures declined somewhat in 
November of 2010, this decline “likely is due to voluntary 
foreclosure suspensions put in place in the fall of 2010 in 
response to the documentation irregularities situation” rather 
than to any decline in defaults or greater loan modification 
efforts.56 
The primary federal response to the foreclosure crisis has 
been the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, announced in 
February 2009 and initially intended to “help as many as 3 to 4 
million financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by 
modifying loans . . . .”57  The primary component of MHA is the 
Home Affordable Modification Program.  While HAMP was 
initially designed to modify a million loans per year from its start 
in 2009, as of November 2010, it had produced fewer than 
550,000 permanent loan modifications.58 
 
 52 Statement by Elizabeth A. Duke: Hearings Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. On 
Hous. and Comty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (testimony of Elizabeth A. Duke, 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Board), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/duke20101118a.htm. 
 53 See Schwartz & Streitfeld, supra note 50. 
 54 See Statement by Elizabeth Duke, supra note 52, at 5. 
 55 See John Gittelsohn, Negative Home Equity Rises, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 
10, 2011, at A8. 
 56 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 112TH CONG., MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 88–89 
(2011), available at http://cop.senate.gov/reports/. 
 57 Home Affordable Modification Program: Overview, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
 58 Making Home Affordable Program, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/ 
Nov%202010%20MHA%20Report.pdf (last visited May 11, 2011). 
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II.  THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
MORTGAGE SERVICING 
For too long, mortgage servicing has been relatively 
unregulated, with no one agency given the task of overseeing 
servicing and preventing abuses by servicers and no national 
standards for servicer regulation.  Federal regulation of mortgage 
servicing has been, in the words of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) “limited and fragmented.”59  Federal 
law provides little protection for borrowers from abusive 
servicing.  Even federal regulators have bemoaned the lack of 
national servicing standards and the need to develop them.60  
While some have been arguing for national mortgage standards 
for years, those calls have recently grown louder, and for good 
reason, given servicer misbehavior.61 
The primary federal law governing servicing is the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), which is designed to 
inform borrowers when the servicing rights to their mortgage 
have been transferred, to give them some disclosure of how that 
transfer will affect them, and to provide some protection from 
late fees during transfer.62  In addition, RESPA was intended to 
prevent kickbacks and referral fees that can drive up the cost of 
settlement services.63  Furthermore, RESPA allows borrowers to 
seek some information regarding their loan’s payment history 
and current status and requires servicers to respond to those 
requests as well as requests that errors in the account be 
corrected.  While RESPA can be useful for borrowers, its 
usefulness is relatively limited as to protection from abusive 
servicers and does not reach many of the current issues 
embroiling the servicing industry.64 
 
 59 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 14. 
 60 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 54. 
 61 See Alan Zibel, Regulators Urged to Devise National Loan Servicing Standards, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/ 
2010/12/21/regulators-urged-to-devise-national-loan-servicing-standards/ (reporting on a 
letter signed by a group of academics, analysts, and investors urging the establishment of 
a set of national standards for mortgage servicing). 
 62 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a)–(b) (2006). 
 63 See Patricia Quinn Robertson, Kickbacks, RESPA and the Title Insurance 
Industry: How to Get a Foot in the (Courthouse) Door, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 270, 270 (2007) 
(“Goals of RESPA include the provision of ‘more effective advance disclosure to home 
buyers and sellers of settlement costs’ and ‘elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that 
tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services.’” (quoting 12 
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)–(2) (2000)). 
 64 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
(2011) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7–8), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1324023 (noting the lack of rights RESPA grants to borrowers). 
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Other federal laws regulating servicers also do little to quell 
abusive practices by servicers.  Until recently, the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA) affected servicers little.  It was amended in 
2009, however, to provide servicers some safe harbor from 
liability to investors should servicers enter into loan 
modifications with borrowers.  The goal was to lessen the effect of 
“tranche warfare,” whereby some investors could claim that their 
individual interests were harmed by a loan modification, even if 
the modification helped investors as a whole.65  While this 
amendment gives servicers protection against some claims as 
they modify loans, it does not give borrowers more leverage in 
obtaining such loan modifications.  Recent changes to Regulation 
Z implementing TILA require prompt crediting of mortgage loan 
payments and forbid charging late fees on unpaid late fees.66 
While the existing statutory framework provides little 
protection for borrowers from the improper fees, shoddy 
paperwork, and unnecessary foreclosures that have marred the 
mortgage servicing industry, some federal agencies have the 
power to sanction servicers for such practices and have on 
occasion used that power.  For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission has reached significant settlements with mortgage 
servicers accused of abusive treatment of borrowers, including a 
2003 settlement with Fairbanks Capital providing a $40 million 
fund for injured borrowers, which included a set of “best 
practice[s] guidelines for mortgage servicing,”67 a 2007 
modification of that settlement with additional guidelines,68 a 
2008 settlement for $28 million with Bear Stearns and its 
servicers that included the establishment of a data integrity 
system,69 and a settlement for $108 million with Countrywide’s 
 
 65 See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 
1638 (2009).  For a discussion of this point, see Levitin & Twomey, supra note 64 
(manuscript at 56).  “Tranche warfare” is the battle between different classes (or 
“tranches”) of investors who may have conflicting interests regarding whether a servicer 
modifies or forecloses on a loan.  For a description of tranche warfare, see Kurt Eggert, 
Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course 
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 560–62 (2002). 
 66 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(ii) (2008); Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 522 (July 
30, 2008). 
 67 For a discussion of Fairbanks’ actions and the FTC litigation against Fairbanks, 
see Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 753, 761–67 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992095. 
 68 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC, Subprime Mortgage Servicer 
Agree to Modified Settlement (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08/ 
sps.shtm (announcing the modification of a settlement between the FTC and Fairbanks 
Capital which provides additional benefits to consumers). 
 69 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage 
to Pay $28 Million to Settle FTC Charges of Unlawful Mortgage Servicing and Debt 
Collection Practices (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/emc.shtm 
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loan servicing operation, which the FTC had accused of inflating 
loan fees.70  While such actions are helpful and clearly necessary, 
the FTC’s actions have been too limited to have a significant 
effect on the servicing industry.  Furthermore, the FTC’s 
authority does not extend to depository institutions themselves.71 
Other federal agencies or quasi-federal organizations have 
the authority to regulate servicing organizations but so far have 
focused more on the safety and soundness of their regulated 
institutions or on their own pecuniary gain than on preventing 
servicer misbehavior that primarily damages borrowers.72  
According to a recent GAO report, “federal banking regulators 
have not regularly examined servicers’ foreclosure practices on a 
loan-level basis.  Instead, previous federal regulatory 
examinations of mortgage servicers have focused on loan 
modifications or on the income banks earn from servicing 
loans.”73 
At a December 2010 Senate hearing, officials from the OCC, 
the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as well as a governor of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, all testified 
about problems in the mortgage and servicing industry.74  By and 
large, they acknowledged that they had some authority over 
mortgage servicing, that there was a significant problem with 
mortgage servicing, and that they were currently investigating 
the scope of the problem and hoped to have some idea soon how 
widespread the problem was and what they could and should do 
about it.75 
It is telling that to a great extent this widespread servicer 
abuse appears to have come as some surprise to these agencies, 
 
(announcing settlement between FTC, Bear Stearns, and EMC Mortgage which requires 
the installation of a data integrity program). 
 70 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million 
for Overcharging Struggling Homeowners: Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled 
Loans of Borrowers in Bankruptcy (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2010/06/countrywide.shtm (announcing $108 million settlement due to Countrywide’s 
deceptive loan collection practices). 
 71 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45(a)(2) & 58 (2006). 
 72 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
92–93 (2008). 
 73 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 17. 
 74 For the written testimony of these federal regulators, as well as an archived 
webcast of their oral testimony, see Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to 
Foreclosure, Part II, U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(2010), http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing& 
Hearing_ID=ea6d7672-f492-4b1f-be71-b0b658b48bef. 
 75 Id. 
Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:22 PM 
2011]  Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab 187 
despite their power to investigate and regulate servicers.  John 
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency noted: 
The OCC supervises all national banks and their operating 
subsidiaries, including their mortgage servicing operations.  The 
servicing portfolios of the eight largest national bank mortgage 
servicers account for approximately 63 percent of all mortgages 
outstanding in the United States—nearly 33.3 million loans totaling 
almost $5.8 trillion in principal balances as of June 30, 2010.76 
The OCC is “the primary regulator for banks that service 
78.3 percent of loans serviced by the top 25 servicers.”77  With 
such broad supervisory powers over such a significant segment of 
the servicing industry, the OCC should have been in a position to 
monitor ongoing servicer behavior, to detect servicer misbehavior 
as it happened, and to administer timely corrective measures, 
including real sanctions for servicer misbehavior. 
Unfortunately, however, the OCC appears to have had far 
greater interest in preserving the powers of its client banks than 
in protecting the borrowers/consumers affected by the servicing 
operations of those banks.  First of all, its primary mission is 
protecting the safety and soundness of its regulated financial 
institutions, and when the banks’ soundness seems threatened 
by consumer protection, the OCC perpetually seems to opt 
against consumer protection.78  Also, as much as ninety-five 
percent of the OCC’s income comes from the banks that it 
regulates, giving it a financial incentive to protect its client 
banks.79  The OCC receives no Congressional funding, and so 
depends on fees from banks, such as examination or application 
fees.80 
It appears that only recently has the OCC made any 
significant investigation into foreclosure misconduct by servicers.  
The OCC has acknowledged that until recently, it paid scant 
attention to servicers’ foreclosure activities, abusive or not: “We 
looked at the final stage of the process and thought of it as one 
 
 76 Id. (testimony of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency). 
 77 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 17. 
 78 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Written Testimony on the Credit Card Industry 
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House 
Committee on Financial Services, April 26, 2007 13–20 (The George Washington Univ. 
Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 517, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729840 (noting how rarely the OCC has sanctioned any 
national bank for a consumer protection violation, especially when compared to state 
banking regulators). 
 79 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 72, at 93. 
 80 See About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
http://www.occ.gov/about/index-about.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
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that would be governed by standards and procedures in internal 
controls,” the OCC chief counsel stated.81  A GAO report on the 
servicers and foreclosures noted, “[a]lthough various federal 
agencies have authority to oversee most mortgage servicers, past 
oversight of their foreclosure activities has been limited, in part 
because banking regulators did not consider these practices as 
posing a high risk to banks’ safety and soundness . . . .”82 
After the robo-signing affair reached the news, the OCC and 
other federal agencies with banking oversight announced with 
great fanfare an investigation into the practices of their 
regulated servicers.  They claimed that they sent teams of 
investigators to pour over the books of the servicers and review 
their practices, and issued a report that showed that their 
investigators had discovered “significant problems in foreclosure 
processing at the servicers” though also that “borrowers subject 
to foreclosure in the reviewed files were seriously delinquent on 
their loans.”83 
This report itself disclosed how minimal the inspection of 
servicers by the federal agencies was, however.  The 
investigation seemed to rely primarily on servicers’ self-
assessment, as examiners reviewed only “approximately 2,800 
borrower foreclosure files” from the two year period ending in 
December 2010, or about 200 files at each of the fourteen 
servicers.84  Even the federal examiners noted that this was “a 
relatively small number of foreclosure files given the volume of 
recent foreclosures processed by these servicers . . . .”85  The 
reviewers did not examine the “entire cycle of the borrowers’ 
loans or potential mortgage-servicing issues outside of the 
foreclosure process,” and so would have missed foreclosures 
caused by earlier servicer errors.86  The report acknowledges that 
“examiners may not have uncovered cases of misapplied 
payments or unreasonable fees, particularly when these actions 
occurred prior to the default,” leaving one to wonder what the 
examiners were looking for if not those basic elements of servicer 
 
 81 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators Lagged in Foreclosure Oversight, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 82 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43. 
 83 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & 
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices, 
1, 3 (Apr. 2011), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency_ 
review_foreclosures_20110413.pdf [hereinafter INTERAGENCY REVIEW]. 
 84 INTERAGENCY REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1. 
 85 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 25. 
 86 INTERAGENCY REVIEW, supra note 83, at 3. 
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abuse.87  The FDIC, in a follow-up report, noted how minimal the 
interagency examination of servicers was, stating that the 
examination “did not review allegations of improper servicing or 
loss mitigation, such as misapplied payments, unreasonable fees, 
inappropriate force-placing of insurance, failure to consider 
adequately a borrower for loan modification, or requiring a 
borrower to be delinquent to qualify for a loan modification.”88 
After this minimal investigation, the federal agencies 
decreed a minimal enforcement action against the servicers, 
requiring them mostly to “[r]etain an independent firm to 
conduct a review of residential foreclosure actions that were 
pending” during the same time period as the federal agencies’ 
review “to determine any financial injury to borrowers caused by 
errors” by the servicers’ misbehavior “and to remediate, as 
appropriate . . . .”89  Servicers are also required to hire a firm to 
conduct risk assessment for the servicers.  In other words, the 
federal agencies punted their investigation and oversight role to 
a firm to be hired by each servicer, leaving open the possibility, if 
not likelihood, that servicers will choose oversight firms that 
signal a willingness to protect the interests of the servicer itself, 
rather than the borrowers.  Worse yet, the “independent reviews” 
will not be made public, according to the OCC, so that the public 
cannot determine whether the reviews have any validity.90 
The remainder of the agencies’ enforcement order is akin to 
ordering the servicers to come up with better policies and get 
back to the agencies to let the agencies know what the servicers 
had done, with little indication what will happen if the servicers’ 
proposed changes do not meet federal approval.  Worse yet, 
federal regulators have not indicated any intention to increase 
their oversight of servicers following this review.  As noted by a 
GAO report, “[a]lthough regulators have taken enforcement 
actions against servicers, they have not identified specifically 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Regulatory Actions Related to Foreclosure 
Activities by Large Servicers and Practical Implications for Community Banks, 
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, May 2011, at 4, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
examinations/supervisory/insights/sise11/SI_SE2011.pdf. 
 89 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 13 (Apr. 2011), available at www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency_review_foreclosures_20110413.pdf. 
 90 Jon Prior, Independent Reviews in Mortgage Servicer Consent Orders to Stay 
Sealed, HOUSINGWIRE, May 13, 2011, http://www.housingwire.com/2011/05/13/ 
independent-reviews-in-mortgage-servicer-consent-orders-to-stay-sealed. 
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how they will change the extent and frequency of future 
oversight of servicers going forward.”91 
Given the lackadaisical attitude that the OCC and other 
federal regulators have demonstrated toward servicer 
misbehavior, it is reasonable to worry that the OCC and others 
are using their purported investigation of, and enforcement 
action against, servicers merely as a way to stall for time, and 
will not take meaningful action to deter and punish servicer 
misbehavior.  Instead, the OCC and other federal regulators may 
well still be acting primarily to protect bank/servicers’ financial 
soundness and their own turf as banking regulators, to the 
detriment of homeowners and borrowers. 
Another part of the mortgage servicing problem is the role of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in overseeing servicers, and their 
self-interest in performing those roles.  Fannie and Freddie, 
quasi-governmental bodies with their own pecuniary interests at 
stake, have been given much of the task of regulating servicer 
conduct, both directly for the loans they have purchased or 
guaranteed, and through the HAMP program.92  Treasury 
granted Fannie and Freddie this power by entering into contracts 
with them to oversee HAMP.93  Under those contracts, Fannie 
Mae was designated as the point of contact for servicers that 
participate in HAMP, not only to pay them for their HAMP 
modifications, but also to instruct them how loans should be 
modified.94  Fannie Mae was also supposed to “help design and 
execute a program that implements standardized, streamlined 
mortgage modifications for all types of servicers, regardless of the 
risk holder . . . and that lowers monthly payments for qualified 
borrowers.”95 
Freddie Mac, on the other hand, was hired by Treasury to be 
its program compliance agent, to examine and investigate 
mortgage servicers to ensure that servicers comply with the 
 
 91 GAO DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REPORT, supra note 43, at 31. 
 92 See Henry E. Hildebrand III, HAMP and Your Chapter 13 Practice, 29 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 12, 74 n.8 (2010) (“Loans that are owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac must be examined for HAMP modification.  Loans that are owned by others 
are encouraged to participate by contract.”). 
 93 See Theresa R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Past, Present, and Future, 
11 CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 231, 232 (2009). 
 94 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENT FOR A 
HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION PROGRAM UNDER THE EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT 
OF 2008, EXHIBIT A 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/about/procurement/faa/Financial_Agency_Agreements/Fannie%20Mae%20FAA%
20021809.pdf. 
 95 Id. at 1. 
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published rules of HAMP and to report to Treasury the results of 
its investigations.96  Freddie Mac was given the authority to 
conduct on-site audits of servicers and, in consultation with 
Treasury, require certain corrective measures by servicers, such 
as suspending foreclosures.  Treasury, through the actions of its 
MHA Compliance Committee, could impose penalties on 
servicers that fail to comply with their HAMP obligations, such 
as withholding or requiring repayment of incentive payments.97  
Treasury has failed to use this power to any significant extent, 
however.  According to the Congressional Oversight Panel’s 
December 2010 report, “Treasury has seemed reluctant to do 
more than vaguely threaten the potential for clawbacks of HAMP 
payments.  Despite rampant anecdotal stories of servicer errors, 
to date, no servicer has experienced a clawback or other financial 
repercussion.”98  The Treasury Department recently announced 
that the three worst offending mortgage servicers would suffer 
some financial repercussion, though it is not clear how significant 
these penalties will be.  After finding that four of the nation’s 
largest servicers were in need of substantial improvement to 
conform to HAMP guidelines, Treasury announced, “[b]eginning 
this month, Treasury will withhold servicer incentives owed to 
three of the four servicers requiring substantial improvement 
until those servicers make certain identified improvements.”99  
Thus, even though Treasury’s report indicates that the largest 
servicers needed significant improvement, its only punishment 
was to withhold some payments until that improvement occurs, 
when presumably the servicers will be made whole.100 
It has become apparent that Fannie and Freddie performed 
their oversight function poorly, likely in large part because their 
own financial interests conflict with regulating servicer behavior 
to protect borrowers from abusive practices.  The Congressional 
Oversight Panel (Panel) has noted Fannie and Freddie’s self-
 
 96 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENT FOR A 
HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION PROGRAM UNDER THE EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT 
OF 2008, EXHIBIT A 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/about/procurement/faa/Financial_Agency_Agreements/freddie% 
20mac%20financial%20agency%20agreement.pdf. 
 97 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT 50 
(2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010243/http:// 
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf. 
 98 Id. at 50. 
 99 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE REPORT AND 
SERVICER ASSESSMENTS FOR FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/ 
April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF. 
 100 Id. 
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interest in overseeing HAMP, and how that self-interest may 
limit Freddie’s willingness to engage in aggressive oversight of 
mortgage servicers.  Regarding Freddie Mac, the Panel reported: 
In response to revelations that servicers have been using “robo-
signers” to submit false affidavits in thousands of foreclosure cases, 
Freddie Mac noted that . . . [t]rying to enforce Freddie Mac 
contractual rights, however, “may negatively impact our relationships 
with these seller/servicers, some of which are among our largest 
sources of mortgage loans.”101 
Also weakening the oversight of mortgage servicers has been 
the voluntary nature of this HAMP oversight.  While it is not 
clear what the servicers’ rights are, some have been concerned 
that if Treasury through Fannie and Freddie were to crack down 
on servicer behavior, then servicers would attempt to leave the 
HAMP program to avoid sanction.102  As a result of this lack of 
oversight, servicers often have acted as if they were free to 
violate or simply ignore the HAMP guidelines intended to 
promote loan modifications.103 
Because of the great weakness of the current regulation of 
mortgage servicers, it seems clear that a new system of national 
mortgage servicer regulation is in order to provide a floor of 
regulation below which servicers cannot go.  A natural agency to 
draft such regulations would be the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, to be established as mandated by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  While 
this Bureau is now ramping up, however, it is not clear how soon 
it will be in a position to draft national servicing regulations and 
to enforce them once it officially opens for business in July 2011. 
III.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION 
While states wait for federal action on mortgage servicer 
regulation, they could take action on their own.  However, to a 
great extent, state servicer regulation has been hampered by the 
 
 101 See DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 97, at 82.  The Panel added that 
“[t]he Panel condemns this sentiment.  If Freddie Mac is hesitant to jeopardize their 
relationships with servicers to enforce their rights in their own book of business, it is 
reasonable to worry that they may be similarly unwilling to risk these relationships on 
Treasury’s behalf by aggressively overseeing HAMP servicers.” Id. 
 102 See id. at 51, 87 n.330. 
 103 See Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing 
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) 
(testimony of Diane E. Thompson), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9 
(“Advocates continue to report that borrowers are denied improperly for HAMP, that 
servicers solicit opt-outs from HAMP, and that some servicers persistently disregard 
HAMP applications.”). 
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fact that many of the largest mortgage servicers are parts of 
federally regulated financial institutions and have been able to 
claim that state regulation over them is preempted.104  
Preemption of state law by federal law or regulation comes in 
many varieties, with the touchstone of all forms being the 
purpose of Congress.105  Preemption doctrine has a long and 
tortured history, with courts and academics grappling with its 
challenges more or less successfully through the years.106  
Generally, preemption analysis starts with the “assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded 
by the [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”107  Preemption can be expressly stated or 
implied by statute.108  Preemption implied by statute can either 
be through conflict preemption, where state law conflicts with 
federal law, or field preemption, “where Congress has legislated 
so comprehensively in a field that it must have intended national 
uniformity of regulation, and, therefore, its legislation displaces 
all state regulation” without regard to whether there is a specific 
conflict with federal law.109  Another way of describing field 
preemption is that state law is preempted “where the scheme of 
federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that there is no room for state action.”110 
Conflict preemption has two distinct types: (1) direct conflict 
preemption, where state and federal law directly contradict each 
other such that it would be impossible to comply with both; and 
 
 104 The OCC oversees over sixty percent of mortgage servicing. See Problems in 
Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure, Part II: Hearing Before the U.S. S. 
Comm. On Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (testimony of John 
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=c1fac0f6-5ac5-4ae5-85cc-e2220255dfd9. 
 105 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress 
is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). 
 106 For useful articles on the history and development of preemption doctrine, see 
Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2085, 2112–17 (2000); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual 
and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 225, 298 (2000). 
 107 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946).  See also Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–604 (1977) (“‘[W]e start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that  
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)). 
 108 See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
1217, 1220–21 (2010). 
 109 Id. at 1221. 
 110 Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 
1979) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)). 
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(2) preemption where the state law is “an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”111  Direct conflict preemption, where it is impossible 
to comply with both federal and state law, is a rarity, however.112  
Therefore, courts attempting to apply conflict preemption 
typically grapple with the issue of whether state law or 
regulation is a sufficient obstacle to federal law or regulation that 
it should be preempted. 
In addition to preemption through federal statute, state law 
can also be preempted by the action of federal regulatory 
agencies.113  “Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect 
than federal statutes.”114  Also, agencies may attempt to preempt 
state law either through express statements of preemption or by 
enacting regulations that conflict with existing state law.115  If 
the scheme of agency regulation of an area is so pervasive as to 
leave no room for state action, then field preemption is implied.116  
However, it would upset the balance of federalism to assume 
blanket preemption simply because of extensive regulation of an 
area.117  Because Congressional purpose is the touchstone of 
preemption, agency power to preempt must come from Congress, 
which may grant agencies preemption power either directly, 
stating that agencies have the power to make preemption 
declarations, or indirectly, giving agencies the power to take 
actions which, through their conflict with state law, preempt 
those laws.118 
A crucial question, and one subject to much current debate, 
is whether and how much deference courts should give to agency 
declarations and decisions regarding the preemptive effects of 
 
 111 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 112 See Davis, supra note 106, at 1244. 
 113 See William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal 
Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (2010).  Recognition of agencies’ preemptive 
effect on state law goes back, some argue, at least to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 
Wheat.) (1824).  See Funk, at 1234–35. 
 114 Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
 115 See Funk, supra note 113, at 1235. 
 116 Rice Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 117 See John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-emption of State Banking Law, 
18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 317–18 (1999) (“To infer pre-emption whenever an agency 
deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a 
federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive.  Such a rule, of 
course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy 
Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 118 See Funk, supra note 113, at 1235–36 (explaining how agency regulations may 
expressly preempt state law or may have the effect of doing so). 
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their actions.119  Agencies that seek the greatest latitude in 
preempting state law would prefer that their preemption 
decisions be given Chevron deference, a standard which requires 
greater administrative procedure to establish a regulation, but 
provides an agency with greater deference to its determination, 
so long as it is reasonable.120  A lesser standard is Skidmore 
deference, which requires less daunting administrative procedure 
to establish a regulation, but leaves greater discretion to courts 
to determine preemption.121  Some academic commentators have 
urged against granting federal agencies Chevron deference 
regarding their preemption determinations, arguing, among 
other things, that federal agencies lack expertise on the effects of 
preemption, or that agencies lack sufficient political 
accountability in their consideration of states’ interests.122  
Others have urged courts to take a “hard look” at agency 
declarations of preemption not grounded in express powers 
granted by Congress.123 
In the 2009 case, Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court 
indicated that in determining whether state law conflicts with 
federal regulation, courts should not defer “to an agency’s 
conclusion that state law is pre-empted” but instead should 
attend to the agency’s explanation of any such conflict.124  The 
Court noted that, absent delegation of preemption powers by 
Congress, federal agencies possess no inherent “authority to 
pronounce on pre-emption,” though they do “have a unique 
understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant 
 
 119 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 695, 699, 702–03 (2008) (arguing that federal agencies are poorly suited to 
make preemption decisions, given their “particular stake in validating their own policy 
decisions,” their lack of stake in protecting state autonomy, and the likelihood that 
agencies would extend preemption of state law far beyond that intended by Congress). 
 120 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 
1998 & n.268 (2008) (explaining that agency decisions made after formal procedures, such 
as notice and comment, will receive great deference by the courts). 
 121 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 164 (1944).  For a discussion of 
Skidmore deference, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1998 & n.268. 
 122 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 
758–98 (2004) (arguing against Chevron deference for agency preemption determinations 
given their lack of expertise regarding the effects of such preemption, and discussing 
alternative theories regarding agency political accountability). 
 123 Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door to “Hard-Look” Review of Agency Preemption, 
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 359 (2009).  The author argues that while appearing 
deferential to agency preemption decisions, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961), was actually mandating “a hard-look review [that] requires 
a court to search for the rationale and reasoning underlying the agency’s decision.” See id. 
at 361. 
 124 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009). 
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ability to make informed determinations about how state 
requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”125  
How much deference to grant agency claims of preemption has 
become a crucial issue in the banking industry, because federal 
banking regulators have made extensive claims that their 
regulation preempts the powers of the states to govern banks’ 
activities. 
A The Previous Co-Existence of State and Federal 
Regulation of National Banks and Thrifts 
Many statutes come into play in the effect of federal 
preemption on the banking industry.126  Two sets of statutes and 
regulators are central to the federal preemption for national 
banks and thrifts: (1) the National Bank Act (NBA), which 
charters national banks that are overseen by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency; and (2) the Home Owners Loan Act 
(HOLA), which charters Federal Savings associations (also 
known as “thrifts”), that are currently supervised by the Office of 
Thrift Supervision.127 
For many decades since the enactment of the NBA in 1863–
1864 and HOLA in 1933, these statutes were construed to 
recognize the importance of the dual federal and state banking 
system, as well as the extensive role that state law plays in the 
operation even of federally regulated banks and thrifts.128  Both 
the courts and Congress were concerned about preserving the 
“competitive equality” of the dual state and federal banking 
system and so strove to keep them on at least somewhat equal 
 
 125 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 126  Among the federal statutes with the most significant preemptive effect in the 
mortgage industry are: the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216 (2006); Home 
Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–70 (2006); Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f (2006); National Credit Union 
Administration, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (2006); and the Alternative Mortgage Transactions 
Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–06 (2006).  For a more complete description of various 
federal laws preempting state law in the mortgage and banking industry, see ELIZABETH 
RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND 
INDUSTRY ABUSES 53–55 (4th ed. 2009). 
 127 In addition, there is the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) providing for credit 
unions supervised by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).  However, as 
credit unions do not loom large in the mortgage meltdown or its aftermath, the NCUA 
will be little discussed herein. 
 128 For an extensive discussion of the history of preemption in the banking industry, 
see generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s 
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004). 
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footing.129  On the other hand, national banks and thrifts and 
federal regulators have vociferously argued that because the 
federal government has always played a significant role in the 
regulation of the banking industry, and a dominant one for 
national banks, there should be no presumption against 
preemption of state law as to national banks.130 
Notably, NBA and HOLA are virtually silent regarding 
whether they preempt state law.  The NBA has only one direct 
assertion of preemption in its text, which is the provision that 
national banks can abide by either state usury limits or, 
alternatively, a federal one.131  The Supreme Court has never 
held that the NBA occupies the field of law generally regarding 
regulation of national banks, even though it does occupy the field 
regarding usury claims.132 
The Supreme Court commented on the great role state law 
plays in governing national banks in 1869, stating that national 
banks: 
are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily 
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.  
All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws.  Their 
acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, 
and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law.  It is 
only when the State law incapacitates the [national] banks from 
discharging their duties to the [federal] government that it becomes 
unconstitutional.133 
Traditionally, therefore, national banks’ “right to collect 
their debts,” which is the core of servicing, is “based on State 
law.” 
Decades later, the Court reemphasized the role state law 
plays in regulating national banks and rejected the idea of field 
preemption by federal regulation in St. Louis v. Missouri.134  In 
1978, however, the Court extended the reach of the NBA’s usury 
 
 129 Duncan, supra note 117, at 222 (‘“Competitive equality’ became shorthand in the 
courts for the complex state-federal balances created by federal banking statutes.”). 
 130 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
 131 See Lauren K. Saunders, Restore the States’ Traditional Role as “First Responder,” 
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, at 4–5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/ 
preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf. 
 132 See Duncan, supra note 117, at 223.  See also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 126, 
at 84 & nn.273–74 (citing Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 THE, 2008 WL 
1883484 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008), for the proposition that the NBA does not occupy the 
field of banking, and Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003), which applies 
express preemption language to usury claims). 
 133 See Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869). 
 134 See St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656–61 (1924). 
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preemption by holding that national banks had “most favored 
lender” status in their respective home states and decreed that 
national banks could export their own home states’ usury limits 
to other states in which they do business.135 
In 1994, Congress appeared to attempt to rein in preemption 
claims by the OCC when, during the enactment of the Riegle-
Neal Act, it directed the OCC, as well as courts, to try to 
harmonize state and federal law where possible, rather than 
finding preemption-causing conflict, noting that the OCC should 
not decide that a state law is preempted unless “the legal basis is 
compelling and the Federal policy interest is clear.”136  Since 
preemption is based on and reflects Congressional intent, clear 
direction such as this should be a guidepost to limit the extent of 
preemption caused by OCC regulations. 
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Barnett 
Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, which laid out the Court’s view 
of the preemption effects of federal banking law.137  In Barnett, a 
national bank sued Florida’s Department of Insurance, seeking 
to enjoin it from enforcing a state statute that prohibited some 
banks from selling many varieties of insurance, arguing that this 
statute was preempted by a 1916 federal statute that provided 
that banks may sell insurance in certain instances.138  The 
Supreme Court held that because the federal law granted 
national banks a power, in this case to sell insurance, that grant 
of power preempted a state law that would deny such power.139  
However, the Court noted that national banks are still subject to 
state regulation and provided a standard by which to determine 
whether state law should be preempted by the NBA and OCC 
regulation:  
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting 
a power to national banks, these cases take the view that normally 
Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, 
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted.  To say this is 
not to deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where 
 
 135 See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 & n.26 
(1978). 
 136 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53–55 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2074. 
 137 See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996). 
 138 See id. at 28–29.  The federal statute in question was the Act of Sept. 7, 1916 
(Federal Statute). See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006). 
 139 See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 37 (“[W]e conclude that the Federal Statute means to 
grant small town national banks authority to sell insurance, whether or not a State 
grants its own state banks or national banks similar approval.”). 
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(unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with 
the national bank’s exercise of its powers.140 
This case therefore lays out what the Supreme Court, in 
1996, viewed as the appropriate preemption standard for state 
regulation of national banks.  States do have the power to 
regulate national banks so long as their regulation does not 
“prevent or significantly interfere with the national 
bank’s . . . powers” or does not “forbid or . . . impair significantly, 
the exercise of a power that Congress [has] explicitly granted.”141  
Congress explicitly adopted the Barnett standard by citing it in 
subsequent legislation.142 
Like the NBA, HOLA, which governs thrifts, has only very 
limited preemption language, also specifying that thrifts can 
choose between state and federal usury limits, and specifying the 
federal thrift usury limit.143  Because HOLA and the NBA have 
such limited preemption language, courts have generally applied 
the narrower “conflict” preemption analysis to determine if state 
laws purporting to regulate national banks and thrifts were 
preempted, rather than the broader field preemption.144  For 
example, in the 1986 case Departmento de Asuntos del 
Consumidor(DACO) v. Oriental Federal Saving Bank, a federal 
district court employed a conflict preemption analysis in finding 
that local law setting interest rate maximums for retail 
installment contracts was not preempted, and in doing so 
rejected the argument that HOLA necessarily preempted local 
law by occupying the field.145  That court stated that, despite the 
fact that HOLA grants the thrift regulator broad powers, which it 
has used to issue “detailed regulations covering all aspects of 
every federal savings and loan association ‘from its cradle to its 
 
 140 See id. at 33. 
 141 Id. 
 142 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 limits the states’ ability to restrict 
depository institutions or their affiliates from engaging “in any insurance sales, 
solicitation, or crossmarketing activity” and expressly states that this limitation is in 
“accordance with the legal standards for preemption set forth in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County . . . .” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6701(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
 143 See 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (2006).  For a discussion of this point see Adam J. Levitin, 
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 167 
(2009) (noting that except as to national thrifts, HOLA contains no explicit language 
preempting state law). 
 144 In 1982, in finding “an actual conflict between federal and state law,” the Supreme 
Court held that it “need not decide whether the HOLA or the Board’s regulations occupy 
the . . . entire field of federal savings and loan regulation.” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 n.14 (1982). 
 145 Departmento de Asuntos del Consumidor (DACO) v. Oriental Fed. Sav., 648 F. 
Supp. 1194, 1197 (D.P.R. 1986). 
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grave,’ . . . .most courts have been unwilling to blanketly declare 
that Congress has occupied the entire field of federal savings and 
loan association regulation.”146  Another court in 1982 opined in 
discussing HOLA and its accompanying regulations: “The fact 
that federal statutes or regulations covering some aspects of a 
regulated area are, by necessity, complex and detailed, does not 
imply that Congress intended to occupy the entire field to the 
exclusion of state law.”147 
B. Federal Regulators Move to Preempt State Regulation of 
Nation Banks and Thrifts 
During the 1980s, as federal “regulatory zeal” declined and 
states stepped up their regulatory efforts, preemption, which had 
been a backwater of American law, suddenly gained new 
importance.148  Various industries sought to stifle state 
regulation by seeking federal preemption, so as to trump state 
action with federal inaction in regulation.149  In the banking 
industry, banks and thrifts increasingly sought protection from 
state regulation by appealing to federal regulators to assert 
greater preemptive powers.150 
The OTS struck first in 1996 by issuing regulations claiming 
that it had the authority to occupy the field regarding any 
regulation of federal thrifts.151  Its regulation stated, “[p]ursuant 
to sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1463(a), 1464(a), 
OTS is authorized to promulgate regulations that preempt state 
laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations . . . .  
OTS hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for 
federal savings associations.”152  The regulation provides specific 
illustrations of state law that is preempted, and includes: 
“Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or 
 
 146 Id. (quoting Cal. v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 
1951)). 
 147 Morse v. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Whitman, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1280 (D. 
Mass. 1982). 
 148  Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory 
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1430–31 (1984). 
 149 Id. (“Until recently, administrative preemption provisions attracted little political, 
judicial, or scholarly attention. . . .  In the last few years, however, the federal government 
has declined in regulatory zeal, and states and localities have become more protective.  
Faced with stricter state laws varying from state to state, businesses have begun to lobby 
for uniform federal regulations that would preempt more protective state laws.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 150 See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory 
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1309 
(2006). 
 151 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2011). 
 152 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010) (original version at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (1997)). 
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investment or participation in, mortgages.”153  Therefore, with a 
single regulation, the OTS claimed to eliminate any state power 
to regulate thrifts engaged not only in lending, but also in 
servicing loans on behalf of others. 
The OTS did note some exceptions to its claimed field 
preemption in this regulation, preserving state contract law, real 
property law, tort and criminal law, and any law that “[f]urthers 
a vital state interest,” among others, but only “to the extent that 
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal 
savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the 
purposes of paragraph (a) of this section.”154  The OTS made clear 
that these exceptions to preemption were meant merely to 
“preserve the traditional infrastructure of basic state laws that 
undergird commercial transactions, not to open the door to state 
regulation of lending by federal savings associations.”155  
Furthermore, any exception is “intended to be interpreted 
narrowly.  Any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
preemption.”156 
The OTS based its field preemption claim on two sections of 
federal statute, “sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 
1463(a), 1464(a).”157  However, these sections are essentially 
silent as to any explicit Congressional purpose to grant the OTS 
the power to preempt.  12 U.S.C. § 1463(a) provides that the 
OTS, through its director, can issue regulations.158  12 U.S.C. § 
1464(a) provides that the Director of the OTS can, under 
regulations the Director prescribes, “provide for the organization, 
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of [Federal 
savings] associations” and to issue charters for them.159  Neither 
provides any expression that Congress’ purpose was to have the 
OTS occupy the field regarding regulation of thrifts, unless one 
 
 153 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10) (emphasis added). 
 154 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c).  The OTS gave courts instructions on how to apply the 
preemption doctrine in section 560.2, stating that “[w]hen analyzing the status of state 
laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question 
is listed in paragraph (b).  If so, the analysis will end there; the law is preempted.  If the 
law is not covered by paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects lending.  
If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is 
preempted.  This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit 
within the confines of paragraph (c).  For these purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be 
interpreted narrowly.  Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption.” Lending and 
Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,966–67 (Sept. 30, 1996). 
 155 Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,966. 
 156 Id. at 50,966–67. 
 157 12. C.F.R. § 560.2(a). 
 158 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (2006). 
 159 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a). 
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takes the position that anytime Congress allows a federal agency 
to draft regulations, its purpose is to have that agency occupy the 
field, or that federal agencies directed to regulate an area can 
merely announce that their regulations occupy the field for that 
area. 
The OTS, somewhat disingenuously, stated in its 
announcement of the regulations that its preemption regulation 
did not constitute a change in the law, but merely a clearer 
restatement of it, arguing that the regulation merely  
restates long-standing preemption principles applicable to federal 
savings associations, as reflected in earlier regulations, court cases, 
and numerous legal opinions issued by OTS and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), OTS’s predecessor agency.  OTS still 
intends to occupy the field of lending regulation for federal savings 
associations.160 
After the OTS issued regulations purportedly preempting 
the field of thrift regulation, it was perhaps nearly inevitable 
that the OCC would do the same for the regulation of national 
banks.  While thrifts and national banks might appear to be 
different types of entities, in fact the OTS and the OCC were in 
competition, both with each other and with state regulators, over 
subject financial institutions.161  Should the OTS be free to 
provide its member thrifts freedom from state regulation and the 
OCC not, then banks would be tempted to switch from being 
either state chartered institutions or national banks to being 
national thrifts in order to reduce their regulatory burden, thus 
starting a “race to the bottom” to see which regulator would 
mandate the fewest consumer protections and other 
regulations.162  Like that of OTS, the budget of the OCC 
depended largely on fees from the financial institutions it 
regulated, giving the agencies an incentive to maintain or 
increase the number of institutions they regulated, and making 
preemption a valuable tool to lure those institutions away from 
state charters.163  Without broad preemption powers, the OCC 
was no doubt concerned that not only could it not lure banks 
away from state charters, but that the OTS might lure them into 
becoming thrifts.  The OCC was constrained by the fact that the 
Supreme Court had, in 1996, stated the standards for preemption 
governing national banks in the Barnett case, and Congress had 
 
 160 Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,952. 
 161 Duncan, supra note 117, at 318. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1349 (2009). 
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subsequently expressed approval of those standards, as noted 
above.164  However, the OCC brushed such concerns aside.165 
In 2003, the OCC fired a salvo against state regulation of 
national banks, issuing a preemption order finding that the 
Georgia Fair Lending Act, designed to deter predatory lending, 
did not apply to national banks.166  In 2004, the OCC moved to 
preempt state regulation more universally and issued regulations 
purporting to preempt state law generally in the business of 
banking for national banks, including for deposit-taking and 
lending, either with or without mortgages.167  The OCC’s 
regulation went far beyond the existing Barnett standard, 
whereby state law was preempted as to national banks only to 
the extent it would “forbid, or to impair significantly” or “prevent 
or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its 
powers.”168  Instead, the OCC regulation declared any state law 
that would “obstruct, impair, or condition, a national bank’s 
ability to fully exercise” its powers as a national bank was 
preempted.169  This “obstruct, impair, or condition” is a broader 
standard than Barnett’s “forbid, or to impair significantly” or 
“prevent or significantly impair” standard, in that the 
impairment no longer has to be significant.  Even state 
regulation that did not forbid, prevent or significantly impair a 
national bank’s exercise of its powers would be preempted if state 
law merely “conditioned” the use of those powers, which is vague 
and broad language.  The OCC regulations further widened their 
preemptive effect by mandating that only a specific set of state 
laws could apply to national banks, and even then only those that 
had a mere “incidental” effect on national banks’ powers, which 
the regulation preamble defines as those that “form the legal 
infrastructure that makes it practicable” for national banks to 
exist and conduct business and “do not attempt to regulate the 
manner or content of” the business of banking authorized for 
national banks.170 
 
 164 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, Fla. Ins. Comm’y, 517 U.S. 25, 33 
(1996); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010) (original version at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (1997)). 
 165 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904, 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
 166 Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003). 
 167 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
at 1904; 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–09 (2010).  For a discussion of this preemption order, see 
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory 
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV.1, 70–71 (2005). 
 168 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33. 
 169 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007, 7.4009. 
 170 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1912 (Jan. 13, 2004); 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c), 34.4(b). 
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The OCC regulations further limited state action by claiming 
that the OCC has exclusive visitorial powers not only over 
national banks, but also over their operating subsidiaries.171  
Worse yet, even if a state law is not preempted and does apply to 
a national bank, the states themselves cannot enforce that law 
against the national banks, according to OCC’s regulations.172  At 
most, a state can sue the national bank for declaratory relief, 
seeking a judgment that the state law does apply to national 
banks and is not preempted.  However, only the OCC, according 
to its regulations, could then enforce applicable state law, so that 
the OCC could pick and choose which state law to apply, even 
among those that are not preempted.173 
The OCC expanded its powers of preemption in an advisory 
letter by arguing that not only are national banks protected from 
state regulation, even their local non-national bank agents are 
protected from state licensing requirements when they are acting 
in ways related to the national banks’ powers as such.174 
The reaction against the OCC’s preemption expansion was 
swift and initially futile.  All fifty Attorneys General sent a letter 
opposing the increased federal preemption of state law for 
national banks, and they were joined by academics and consumer 
advocates.175  Unfortunately, they were not immediately joined 
by the courts, by and large.  In the case Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, the Supreme Court appeared to condone the OCC’s 
expansion of its powers of preemption, agreeing with the OCC 
that the NBA’s preemption extended even to operating 
 
 171 Travis P. Nelson, Preemption Under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, BANKING LAW 
COMMITTEE JOURNAL, Oct. 2010, at 5, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201010/nelson.pdf. 
 172 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1897; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (“The 
provisions of any State law to which a branch of a national bank is subject under this 
paragraph shall been forced, with respect to such branch, by the Comptroller of the 
Currency.”). 
 173 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1899–900.  For a discussion of 
this point, see Wilmarth, supra note 128, at 228. 
 174 Letter from John E. Bowman, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, 
Authority of a Federal Savings Association to Perform Banking Activities through Agents 
Without Regard to State Licensing Requirements, P-2004-7 (Oct. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/560404.pdf.  For a discussion of this, and the argument 
that preemption protection for non-national banks leads to additional predatory behavior, 
see Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by 
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. 
L. REV. 515, 543 (2007). 
 175 See discussion of the opposition in Peterson, supra note 174, at 70–71.  For an 
opposition letter from multiple consumer advocacy groups, see Letter to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, (Oct. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/CRL-
OCCsignon100603.pdf. 
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subsidiaries of national banks as well as to the banks 
themselves.176  The Supreme Court stated that national banks 
have “the power to engage in real estate lending through an 
operating subsidiary” and that this power of the national banks 
“cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law.”177 
The Watters case is interesting both for what it added to the 
OCC’s preemptive powers and for what it withheld.  On the one 
hand, its extension of federal preemption to the operating 
subsidiaries of national banks, even if those subsidiaries were 
state-chartered, handed national banks and their subsidiaries an 
enormous victory against state regulation.178  At the same time, 
however, the Court failed to adopt the OCC regulations’ more 
expansive preemption language, and instead cited Barnett as 
finding preemption where “state prescriptions significantly 
impair” the authority “enumerated or incidental under the 
NBA.”179  Also, the Court did not rule on the issue of whether the 
OCC had the power to declare the preemptive effects of its action 
or seek judicial deference for its preemption declarations.180  
While noting that the OCC had, by regulation, claimed to limit 
the application of state law to national bank operating 
subsidiaries only to the same extent such laws applied to 
national banks, the Court did not decide what level of deference 
to give those regulations, as its decision was based on the NBA 
itself.181 
The OCC’s and OTS’s efforts to lure financial institutions to 
their charters through preemption appeared to be successful.  
Engel and McCoy noted, “[a]lthough landing Countrywide was a 
huge coup for OTS, the OCC was the biggest beneficiary of 
charter shopping after 2003,” and also quoted the Comptroller as 
crowing within months of adopting the preemption rule, “the past 
several months have seen some notable movements of state 
banks into the national system.”182  The market shares of their 
regulated institutions grew as well.  “Depository institutions and 
their subsidiaries and affiliates accounted for about half of 
nonprime loans originated in 2004 and 2005, 54% in 2006, and 
79% in 2007.”183  Worse yet is the likelihood that the threat of 
 
 176 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 18 (2007). 
 177 Id. at 21. 
 178 Id. at 18. 
 179 Id. at 12. 
 180 Id. at 20. 
 181 Id. at 20–21. 
 182 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 160–61 (2011). 
 183 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
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losing financial institutions to a federal charter encouraged 
states to reduce the regulatory burden on their state-chartered 
institutions. 
During the Bush era, both the OCC and the OTS were 
preempting state law regarding lending practices, not only to 
lure banks and thrifts to their charters, but also in order to 
reduce the total regulatory burden on banks and thrifts, based on 
the belief that the markets should broadly be left to regulate 
themselves.184  The OTS was especially brazen in its lack of 
regulation for its member thrifts, and laid off sixty-nine thrift 
examiners, while its director claimed his goal “was ‘to allow 
thrifts to operate with a wide breadth of freedom from regulatory 
intrusion’” and showed up with a chainsaw at a conference set up 
to proclaim a reduction of red-tape and regulation.185  
Countrywide switched from a bank to a thrift charter specifically 
to take advantage of the fact that the OTS was more restrained 
than the OCC in the application of its guidelines governing 
alternative mortgage products.186 
Federal regulators have since claimed that preempting state 
regulation did not cause the influx of default-prone loans that 
came after the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation.187  However, a 
review of default rates from 2006 to 2008 among depository 
institutions shows that federally regulated banks and thrifts had 
significantly higher default rates than those regulated by the 
states, with federal thrifts by far the worst.188  As noted by Engel 
and McCoy, “the best loan performance was at state bank and 
thrifts, which were subject to both state and federal regulation 
and did not enjoy preemption.”189 
As a result of the federal preemption of state regulation of 
national banks and thrifts, those banks and thrifts 
 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 
1018–19 (2009). 
 184 See McCoy, supra note 163, at 1349 (stating “[c]oncomitantly, OCC regulators and 
their federal bank regulator counterparts were true believers in the ability of market 
structures and new instruments to contain risk.  When market innovations could contain 
risk, the thinking went, why have government regulation?”). 
 185 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 182, at 175. 
 186 Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1. 
 187 See, e.g., John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before Women in 
Hous. & Fin., Washington, DC (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-112.pdf.  Dugan stated, “[i]t is widely 
recognized that the worst subprime loans that have caused the most foreclosures were 
originated by nonbank lenders and brokers regulated exclusively by the states.” Id. 
 188 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 182, at 163. 
 189 Id. 
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understandably became less willing to cooperate with state 
regulators attempting to resolve consumer complaints.  State 
officials reported a noticeable effect from the preemptive strike 
by federal regulators, diminishing state consumer protection 
efforts.190  Although this perception was not universal, many felt 
that national banks were less cooperative with state officials and 
less concerned about consumer complaints.191  While state 
officials stated that they had been able, before the assertion of 
preemption, to informally resolve customer complaints 
efficiently, once the OCC announced its intent to preempt state 
regulation, some state agents felt that national banks became 
significantly less cooperative.192 
Worse yet, the OCC and OTS were not themselves engaging 
in significant enforcement action for violations of consumer 
protection by their regulated institutions.  The OCC provided 
little public evidence that it was sanctioning national banks for 
consumer protection violations.  As Professor Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr. noted:  
The OCC’s record is similarly undistinguished with respect to 
consumer enforcement actions taken against national banks for 
violations of consumer protection laws.  Since January 1, 1995, the 
OCC has taken only thirteen public enforcement actions against 
national banks for violations of consumer lending laws.  With two 
exceptions, all of those actions were taken against small national 
banks.193 
IV.  PREEMPTION AND SERVICER REGULATION 
At the very beginning of the mortgage crisis, it was clear 
that federal preemption of state law would reduce the states’ 
abilities to investigate or regulate the way national banks 
serviced loans.  In 2007, a group of state bank regulators, 
concerned that borrowers were being foreclosed upon 
unnecessarily, requested information from the biggest national 
banks regarding their foreclosure operations.  When two banks 
refused to cooperate, the state bank examiners sent a letter to 
the OCC, requesting its aid.  Rather than helping, the OCC 
 
 190 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD 
FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO 
NATIONAL BANKS, GAO-06-387, at 17 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d06387.pdf. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 17–21. 
 193 Wilmarth, supra note 78, at 14 (noting how rarely the OCC has sanctioned any 
national bank for a consumer protection violation, especially when compared to state 
banking regulators). 
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insisted that national banks should respond only to inquiries 
from federal officials, claiming that it was going to collect the 
information itself and did not want to risk “confusing matters.”194  
Rather than “scrutinize the foreclosure operations” of the large 
national banks, however, the OCC reportedly merely relied on 
the banks’ own internal assessments of their procedures.195  As 
foreclosures mounted and state attorneys tried to investigate the 
causes of the dramatic increase in foreclosures, large servicers 
regulated by the OCC reportedly refused even to turn over basic 
servicing data, citing federal preemption.196 
Federal preemption for national banks is especially 
significant in the servicing industry because, as previously noted, 
residential mortgage servicing is dominated by the servicing 
arms of national banks and thrifts.197  The four largest servicers 
are the servicing arms of Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Chase, 
and CitiMortgage, which between them service over fifty-six 
percent of the market.198  Because many of the largest mortgage 
servicers are the parts of federally regulated financial 
institutions, the expansion of OTS and OCC preemption and the 
extension of preemption to the subsidiaries of national banks and 
thrifts has provided servicers protection from state regulation.  
Both the OTS and the OCC regulations specifically purport to 
preempt all state regulation of mortgage servicing by national 
banks and thrifts.  The OTS regulations list, as examples of  
the types of state laws preempted by paragraph (a) of this 
section . . . state laws purporting to impose requirements 
regarding. . .  
(5) Loan-related fees, including without limitation, initial charges, 
late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees;  
(6) Escrow accounts, impound accounts, and similar accounts; 
. . . .  
(10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or 
investment or participation in, mortgages.199 
 
 194 A description of this episode can be found in Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators 
Lagged in Foreclosure Oversight, WASH. POST, Nov. 8 2010, at A1. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Press Release, Office of Sen. Hillary R. Clinton, Sens. Clinton, Bayh Call on 
Administration, Mortgage Services to Cooperate with State’s Efforts to Address Mortgage, 
Foreclosure Crisis (Apr. 30, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 8047227. 
 197 Wilmarth, supra note 78, at 2. 
 198 Firms Ranked by Number of Loans Serviced at 9/30, MORTGAGE SERVICING NEWS, 
Feb. 2011, at 1. 
 199 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2010). 
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The OCC regulations also expressly purport to preempt state 
regulation of mortgage servicing, stating that “[s]pecifically, a 
national bank may make real estate loans under 12 U.S.C. § 371 
and § 34.3, without regard to state law limitations 
concerning: . . . (10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or 
purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.”200  
The federal preemption of state law governing mortgage 
servicing provided a challenge to courts: while the OTS and OCC 
seemed to indicate a desire to occupy the field of regulating 
mortgage servicing, clearly the states had to play some role in 
providing the legal structure undergirding mortgage servicer 
behavior.  For example, the law governing mortgage foreclosure 
is primarily a state creation, with some states mandating judicial 
procedure and others allowing for non-judicial foreclosures.201  
Given that a foreclosure is one of the most extreme steps taken 
by servicers, federal regulators can hardly be said to occupy all 
mortgage servicing regulation if they have not regulated how 
federally regulated servicers foreclose.202 
Mortgage servicers also needed other forms of state law to 
apply to their mortgages and loans, including state negotiable 
instrument law and contract law.203  Mortgage servicers clearly 
should not be exempt from criminal law and general tort law, 
providing liability for torts such as deception.204  Therefore, 
contract, tort, and real property law were listed as examples of 
the kinds of law NOT preempted by the OTS’s and OCC’s 
regulation.205  The challenge for courts attempting to honor the 
preemption regulations regarding mortgage servicing has been 
trying to distinguish between permissible state regulation of 
 
 200 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a). 
 201 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004) (stating that “[m]ortgage 
foreclosure law is in a state of pronounced disarray.  A sizeable number of states mandate 
judicial foreclosure, while others authorize a nonjudicial ‘power of sale’ foreclosure 
proceeding.  Additionally, many states impose a variety of postforeclosure restrictions, 
including statutory redemption and limitations on deficiency judgments, whereas others 
provide no such protections for debtors.”).  See also Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on 
the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. 
REV. 229, 230–31 (1998) (describing the interplay between state and federal laws 
concerning foreclosure). 
 202 Stark, supra note 201, at 230–32. 
 203 Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(noting that HOLA does not preempt “duties to comply with contracts and the laws 
governing them and to refrain from misrepresentation.”). 
 204 See Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 555–57 (9th Cir. 
2010) (stating that “various district courts have held that the [National Bank] Act does 
not preempt a claim of express deception asserted under state law.”). 
 205 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2(c), 34.4(b) (2010). 
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foreclosures and tort law on the one hand, and what those 
regulations list as impermissible state regulation of servicing on 
the other. 
In a 2007 case, Judge Posner attempted to define the 
demarcation between the arguably preempted regulation of 
servicing and non-preempted tort and contract law.  He noted 
that a borrower should be free to sue a servicer for breach of 
contract or for fraud, given the OTS’s inability to adjudicate 
disputes between borrower and servicer, finding that the 
application of state tort or contract law “would complement 
rather than substitute for the federal regulatory scheme.”206  The 
task of a court, therefore, is to determine which state regulation 
governs lenders and servicers as such, and so would be 
preempted as to federally regulated institutions, and which 
regulation is merely part of the general law of the state.  The 
essential question is “which claims fall on the regulatory side of 
the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the 
common law side.”207 
Courts have struggled, with inconsistent results, to 
determine what state law constitutes “regulating servicing” and 
is therefore deemed preempted by OCC and OTS regulation, and 
what is merely the general law of the state.  One court went so 
far as to state that any state claim against a federally-chartered 
thrift involving improprieties in foreclosures would be preempted 
because such claims would necessarily involve servicing, etc. of 
the loan, though claims that the servicer misled the borrower as 
regarding a loan modification were not preempted.208  Another 
court reached the opposite result on such deception, finding that 
all state claims based on a servicer’s misrepresentations about 
loan modifications were preempted because loan modifications 
are an element of servicing.209  General consumer protection laws 
seem to be part of the general law of the state, however, and 
 
 206 In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643–44 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
 207 Id. at 644.  In that case, the court found that, due to the vagueness of the 
complaint, “the case is largely unripe for a determination of preemption.” Id. at 648. 
 208 Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank & Co, No. 4:11cv00436, 2011 WL 1751415, at *3–4 
(N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011).  The court ruled that claims based on allegations that 
“defendants falsely represented that plaintiff's loan would be modified and that the 
foreclosure sale had been cancelled” were not preempted, however, because they “arise 
from a more ‘general duty not to misrepresent material facts,’ and therefore [do] not 
necessarily regulate lending activity.” Id. at *4 (quoting Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. 2:10cv02799, 2011 WL 1103439, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. March 22, 2011)). 
 209 Wittenberg v. First Indep. Mortg. Co., No. 3:10cv00058, 2011 WL 1357483, at *14 
(N.D. W. Va. April 11, 2011). 
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some courts have for that reason held them not to be 
preempted.210 
Courts have likewise ruled inconsistently on whether state 
restraint against unfair business practices should be preempted 
as to federally regulated servicers.  In a case where borrowers 
alleged that servicers “routinely refused to discuss good faith 
modifications” regarding their loans, the court determined that, 
to the extent such actions constituted a violation of California’s 
Unfair Competition Law, any claim based on that violation was 
preempted by the OTS’s regulations.211  Similarly, where a loan 
servicer was alleged to have engaged in unfair practices by using 
inadequate property valuation methods to evaluate short sales 
and unfair practices in making offers to postpone foreclosures, 
the court found that simply because those activities “relate 
entirely” to the defendant’s “processing, origination, servicing, 
sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages,” 
the claims were preempted.212 
By comparison, in a case where borrowers alleged unfair 
business practices in overcharging for force-placed insurance, the 
court found that California’s Unfair Competition Law was not 
preempted, because it was a general business law, and even 
though the subject matter concerned the servicing of loans, the 
specific claims, that the defendants had made misrepresentations 
and engaged in deceptive conduct, were not specific to lending.213 
Courts have similarly considered whether unfair competition 
laws are preempted by the National Bank Act as to servicers 
regulated by the OCC.214  In one case, a borrower alleged that his 
 
 210 See, for example, Smith v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 2:10-cv-00354, 
2011 WL 843937, at *10 (S.D. W. Va. 2011), where the court states, “[i]nstead, I look to 
the intent of Congress, as best demonstrated by the text of the NBA, and conclude that 
there is no significant federal regulatory objective at play that would merit displacing the 
generally applicable state consumer-protection claims presented in the Complaint.” 
 211 Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 417 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  See also In re 
Ocwen, where the court found that a claim against a servicer pursuant to New Mexico’s 
Unfair Trade Practices Act was preempted because it claimed “‘a gross disparity between 
the value received by the [class] members [in New Mexico] and the price paid,’ a charge 
that clearly is preempted.” In re Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 647. 
 212 Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 213 Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 29–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  See also, Binetti v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 446 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that because the effect on national thrifts was only an incidental part of the 
state’s unfair competition law, that state law was not preempted even as to claims 
regarding federally regulated thrifts). 
 214 Wells v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C10-5001RJB, 2010 WL 4858252, at *10 
(W.D. Wash. 2010), wherein the court found that claims under the Washington Consumer 
Protection Act were not preempted even though they concerned misrepresentations 
regarding foreclosures and borrowers’ requests for loan modifications. 
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servicer had made misrepresentations about whether mortgage 
prepayments would be applied to principal or held in suspense 
accounts.215  The court found that because the borrower relied on 
a general Unfair Competition Law (UCL) rather than a state law 
“specifically directed at banking or lending,” the borrower’s claim 
was not preempted even though it went directly to how the 
servicer serviced the loan.216 
In other cases, where borrowers claimed that a servicer 
committed an unfair or deceptive act in violation of the state’s 
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (UDAP) law, courts have held 
that because the act consisted of mortgage servicing, the state 
UDAP law was preempted even though it was a general business 
law not specifically directed toward servicers.217  In a California 
case, a court found that an unfair business practices claim was 
preempted, stating “each of Plaintiffs’ claims specifically 
challenge the processing of Plaintiffs’ loan modification 
application and servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage, and fall within 
the specific types of preempted state laws listed in § 560.2(b)(4) & 
(10).  Accordingly, each of Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by 
HOLA.”218  Courts have tried to explain these contradictory 
results by arguing that when it comes to general statutes such as 
UDAP, the question is not whether the statute will be generally 
preempted, but rather whether as applied, the statute would 
impose requirements on lending or servicing and so should be 
preempted.219 
In a recent case, the court applied a different standard to 
judge whether state law was preempted, looking not at whether 
the state law was a general one but rather at whether there was 
an applicable federal claim that would preempt the state 
claim.220  In that case, a borrower sued a servicer, alleging that 
the servicer had told him not to make his mortgage payments so 
that the borrower could become eligible for the HAMP program, 
 
 215 Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2008 WL 1883484, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
 216 Id. at *13–14. 
 217 James J. Pulliam, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market Competitors, UDAP Consumer 
Protection Laws, and the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2010). 
 218 Zarif v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 10CV2688-WQH-WVG, 2011 WL 1085660,  
at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 
 219 Casey v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 583 F.3d 586, 593–94 (8th Cir. 2009); Boursiquot 
v. Citibank F.S.B., 323 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Conn. 2004); Moskowitz v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 
329 Ill. App. 3d 144, 263 Ill. Dec. 502, 768 N.E.2d 262 (2002); McCurry v. Chevy Chase 
Bank, F.S.B., 144 Wash. App. 900, 193 P.3d 155 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); Silvas v. E*Trade 
Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 220 Bennett v. Bank of America, No. 3:11cv00003, 2011 WL 1814963, at *2 (E.D. Va.). 
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then foreclosed on his house based on non-payment of the loan.221  
When the borrower brought state law claims for breach of 
contract, fraud, and trespass, the bank/servicer responded by 
claiming that those state law claims were preempted.222  The 
court, however, held that the claims were not preempted because 
there was no corresponding federal claim that the borrower could 
bring, noting that “Congress has not provided an alternative 
claim governing the allegations [the borrower] raises,” and 
therefore neither federal law nor regulation preempted the state 
claims.223 
V.  THE STATES JUMP IN 
States have recently taken more aggressive steps to rein in 
mortgage servicer abuse and to attempt to induce servicers to 
make loan modifications that benefit both the borrower and the 
investor.224  However, their efforts have at times been met with a 
preemption defense.  For example, in 2008, California passed 
Senate Bill 1137, also known as the “Perata Mortgage Relief 
Bill,” which requires, among other things, that in order to file a 
notice of default to start a foreclosure, a servicer or lender must 
follow a proscribed process of notification, meeting, and 
consultation with the borrower, to determine whether the 
servicer/lender and borrower can resolve the default without 
foreclosure.225  The idea is to spur direct discussion between the 
parties for an exploration of alternatives to foreclosure.”226  This 
requirement is now incorporated in section 2923.5 of the 
California Civil Code, part of the state’s statutory framework for 
foreclosures.227 
While section 2923.5 seems to be a minor requirement, 
merely requiring notice and discussion, but not mandating any 
loan modifications, federally regulated servicers have challenged 
it by claiming that it is preempted, at least as to federally 
regulated thrifts.228  Some courts have rejected this preemption 
argument, finding that section 2923.5 requires so little of lenders 
 
 221 Id. at *1. 
 222 Id. at *1, *3. 
 223 Id. at *5. 
 224 Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure Part II: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of 
Kurt Eggert, Professor, Chap. Univ. Sch. of Law). 
 225 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (2010). 
 226 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(f) (2010). 
 227 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (2010). 
 228 Murillo v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. C 09-00503 JW, 2009 WL 2160579, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009). 
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and servicers that it is not preempted by federal law.229  For 
example, in Mabry v. Superior Court, the court found that section 
2923.5, at least narrowly construed, did not step over the line 
that separates the permitted state regulation of foreclosure from 
the state regulation of loan servicing, which would be preempted 
as to financial institutions regulated by the OTS.230  Mabry has 
been cited with approval by several other courts.231 
Another federal court ruled that because section 2923.5 
“imposes a state law mandate about what information must be 
given to borrowers, and includes a strict time frame for doing so” 
and other states do not have such requirements, section 2923.5 
“concerns the processing and servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage and 
is preempted by HOLA.”232  Other federal courts have followed 
suit,233 and have even gone so far as to assert that despite the 
contrary opinions of California courts, “‘it is evident that the 
overwhelming weight of authority has held that a claim under § 
2923.5 is preempted by HOLA.’”234 
Other states have taken more aggressive measures to 
regulate servicers.  Numerous states currently have often 
competing legislative proposals for servicer regulation.  “To date, 
lawmakers in 41 jurisdictions and the District of Columbia have 
 
 229 Mabry v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 218 (2010). 
 230 Id. at 218–19 (“Finally, to the degree that the ‘assessment’ or ‘exploration’ 
requirements impose, in practice, burdens on federal savings banks that might arguably 
push the statute out of the permissible category of state foreclosure law and into the 
federally preempted category of loan servicing or loan making, evidence of such a burden 
is necessary before the argument can be persuasive.  For the time being, and certainly on 
this record, we cannot say that section 2923.5, narrowly construed, strays over the line.”). 
 231 Wienke v. Indymac Bank FSB, No. CV 10-4082 NJV, 2011 WL 871749, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 14, 2011); Paik v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-04016 WHA, 2011 WL 
109482, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); Aguilera v. Hilltop Lending Corp., No. C 10-0184 
JL, 2010 WL 3340566, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010); Kariguddaiah v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. C 09-5716 MHP, 2010 WL 2650492, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). 
 232 Odinma v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C-09-4674 EDL, 2010 WL 1199886, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 23, 2010). 
 233 See Giordano v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 5:1-cv-04661-JF, 2010 WL 5148428, at 
*3–5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010); Taguinod v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, No. CV 10-7864-SVW 
(RZx), 2010 WL 5185845, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010); Ngoc Nguyen v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., No. C-10-4081-EDL, 2010 WL 4348127, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010); 
Pinales v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 09cv1884 L(AJB), 2010 WL 3749427, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 22, 2010); Gonzalez v. Alliance Bancorp, No. C 10-00805 RS, 2010 WL 1575963, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010); Parcray v. Shea Mortg., Inc., No. CV-F-09-1942 
OWW/GSA, 2010 WL 1659369, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010); Murillo v. Aurora Loan 
Servs., LLC, No. C 09-00503 JW, 2009 WL 2160579, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009); 
Murillo v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB, No. C 09-00500 JW, 2009 WL 2160578, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. July 17, 2009). 
 234 Beall v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 10-CV-1900-IEG (WVG), 2011 WL 1044148, 
at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) (quoting Taguinod v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, No. CV 10-
7864-SVW (RZx), 2010 WL 5185845, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010)). 
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introduced legislation regarding foreclosures.”235  New York’s 
Superintendent of Banks issued perhaps the most stringent state 
mortgage servicing regulations in October 2010, requiring 
servicers to pursue suitable loan modifications and imposing a 
“duty of good faith and fair dealing in [the servicer’s] 
communications, transactions, and course of dealings with each 
borrower . . . .”236  The regulations limit what fees servicers can 
charge and requires them to have “adequate staffing, written 
procedures, resources and facilities to provide timely and 
appropriate responses to borrower inquiries and complaints 
regarding available loss mitigation options . . . .”237  Servicers 
must provide timely responses to loan modification requests, and 
where they deny them, must provide the reasons for such 
denial.238  They must also provide a process by which borrowers 
“may escalate disagreements to a supervisory level where a 
separate review of the borrower’s eligibility or qualification for a 
loss mitigation option can be performed” and provide “special 
escalation contacts” for use by housing counselors, attorneys and 
government agents.239  The regulations also allow the state to 
require servicers to provide detailed reports of their modification 
attempts and success.240 
Nevada responded to the high rates of foreclosure by 
requiring mortgage servicers to engage in mediation with 
borrowers who request it.  The borrower and the 
lender/beneficiary split the cost of paying the mediator and the 
lender/beneficiary must be represented at the mediation by 
someone with the authority to modify the loan at issue.241  The 
parties are required to submit a proposal to “resolve the 
foreclosure” and financial information that would allow the 
evaluation of those proposals, and the lender/beneficiary has to 
submit evidence of possession of the note and deed of trust along 
with assignments of the note and deed of trust, as well as the 
“evaluative methodology” used to evaluate the request for a loan 
modification.242  Many different types of foreclosure mediation 
 
 235  NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FORECLOSURES 2011 
LEGISLATION, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=22116. 
 236 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 419.2 (effective May 2, 2011). 
 237 Id. at §§ 419.10–419.11. 
 238 Id. at § 419.11(d). 
 239 Id. at § 419.11(g). 
 240 Id. at § 419.12. 
 241 NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 10(1)(A), available at 
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf. 
 242 NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. 11, available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/ 
images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf. 
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programs have sprung up, some at the state level, others 
mandated by individual court systems.243 
Utah changed its foreclosure laws to require foreclosures to 
be conducted by an in-state attorney or title company.  One large 
bank responded by refusing to follow the law, based on the claim 
that its status as a national bank gave it immunity from this 
aspect of state foreclosure law, reportedly arguing, “[a]s a 
national bank, [its] authority to act as trustee is derived from 
federal law (the National Bank Act).”244 
One potentially productive step that the states have taken is 
the joint action by fifty Attorneys General to investigate 
mortgage servicer abuse and demand change, beginning in 
October 2010.245  That investigation was reportedly quite limited, 
perhaps from fears that the federally regulated mortgage 
servicers would claim preemption and refuse to cooperate.246  
According to one news report after the coalition had already sent 
part of a settlement offer, “no witnesses had been interviewed 
and . . . the coalition had sent out just one request for 
documents—and it has not yet been answered.”247  The coalition 
of Attorneys General reportedly have been negotiating with the 
large banks/servicers to settle claims of widespread improper 
foreclosures, with at least some Attorneys General initially 
pushing for a large fund to provide principal reductions for 
borrowers as well as a set of rules that servicers must follow, 
while banks are suggesting a much smaller settlement fund, no 
mandated principal reductions and fewer rule changes.  The 
parties are also bargaining over how much the banks who are the 
largest servicers should pay to settle with the Attorneys General.  
At least some of the Attorneys General are reportedly asking for 
$20 billion and the banks are reportedly offering $5 billion, with 
the money either going in large part to principal reductions for 
borrowers, under the Attorney General proposal or to repay 
borrowers “previously wronged in the foreclosure process and 
 
 243 Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner’s Right to 
Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
109, 111 (2010). 
 244 Tom Harvey, Bank Defies Utah Law on Foreclosures, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, 
May 12, 2011, at A6. 
 245 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, States to Initiate Joint Foreclosure 
Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2010, at A13. 
 246 Gretchen Morgenson, Swift Deals May Not Be Sound Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2011, at BU1. 
 247 Id. 
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provide transition assistance for borrowers who are ousted from 
their homes” under the banks’ counteroffer.248 
VI.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON PREEMPTION 
Given the recent record of abusive behavior by mortgage 
servicers and also the harm caused by federal preemption of state 
law governing mortgage lending, it is no surprise that when 
Congress decided to reform the financial services industry, it 
included not only some mortgage servicer reform, but also a roll-
back of the preemption effects of OCC and OTS regulation.249  
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) includes Title X, which is separately 
referred to as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (the 
CFP Act).250  The Act contains some direct reforms of mortgage 
servicing.  It mandates the use of escrow accounts in certain 
circumstances and requires disclosure for consumers who waive 
such accounts.251  It imposes new duties on mortgage servicers 
regarding qualified written requests and responses to borrowers, 
force-placed insurance, and refunds of escrow funds.252  It 
requires prompt crediting of loan payments as well as prompt 
responses to loan payoff requests.253  And it requires greater 
transparency in the calculations underlying servicer decisions in 
the HAMP program.254   
More importantly, at least in terms of this article, Dodd-
Frank significantly limits federal preemption of state consumer 
financial laws, even as to national banks and thrifts, and in 
many ways signals an explicit return to the law as it stood in the 
mid-1990s before the OTS and OCC made their preemption 
power grabs.255 
 
 248 Nathan Koppel, Banks Willing to Pay $5 Billion to Settle Mortgage Mess, L. BLOG 
OF THE WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/11/banks-
willing-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-mortgage-mess/. 
 249 LAUREN SAUNDERS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE ROLE OF THE STATES 
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-
of-the-states.pdf. 
 250 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  Title X of Dodd-Frank states, “This title may be cited as the 
‘Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.’” Id. at § 1001. 
 251 Id. at §§ 1461–62. 
 252 Id. at § 1463. 
 253 Id. at § 1464. 
 254 Id. at § 1482. 
 255 See Saunders, supra note 131, at 5–6.  See also Michael Hamburger, The Dodd-
Frank Act and Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 128 BANKING L.J. 
9, 11–12 (2011). 
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Dodd-Frank and the CFP Act constitute a dramatic change 
in the preemption landscape.  Gone are the ideas that the federal 
banking agencies are the sole regulators of banks and thrifts, and 
that banks and thrifts can virtually ignore state regulation.  
Congressional intent is the touchstone for preemption, and Dodd-
Frank shows irrefutable Congressional intent to limit and roll 
back federal preemption of state consumer finance law.256  The 
CFP Act’s subtitle on preemption is called “Preservation of State 
Law.”257  The subtitle reasserts the traditional role that states 
have played in regulating the financial industry, including 
national banks and thrifts. 
Dodd-Frank, drafted in an era when federal preemption of 
state law looms large as an issue, contains specific and extensive 
language regarding its own preemptive effect and the preemptive 
effect of other federal regulations.  Dodd-Frank affects federal 
preemption in four significant ways.  First, the CFP Act states 
explicitly what its own preemption effect is.258  Second, Dodd-
Frank explicitly limits federal preemption of state law by the law 
governing national banks and thrifts and regulations made 
pursuant to that law.259  Third, Dodd-Frank transfers 
responsibility for much federal financial consumer protection 
(depending on the size of the financial institution) to the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is much 
more constrained in how it can preempt state law.260  Lastly, 
Dodd-Frank spells out non-preempted powers of states’ Attorneys 
General to enforce state and federal law.261 
The CFP Act explicitly limits the preemptive power of the 
CFP Act itself, and therefore, presumably any regulations issued 
pursuant to that Act.262  The CFP Act rules out field preemption 
and limits its preemptive effect to conflict preemption, stating it 
has preemptive effect only “to the extent that any such provision 
of law is inconsistent with the provisions of this title, and then 
only to the extent of the inconsistency.”263  Moreover, the CFP Act 
also protects states’ power to provide greater consumer protection 
 
 256 Id. at §§ 1041–43. 
 257 Subtitle D of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial 
Protection Act. 
 258 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 1044–45. 
 259 Id. at § 1043. 
 260 Id. at § 1041. 
 261 Id. at § 1042.  For good descriptions of the changes to preemption made by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, see Saunders, supra note 131, at 5–6; Hamburger, supra note 255, at 
11–12. 
 262 Id. at § 1044. 
 263 Dodd-Frank § 1041(a)(1). 
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than its own terms without state regulation necessarily being 
considered in preemptive conflict with the CFP Act, so that its 
federal consumer protection constitutes a floor rather than a 
ceiling.264 
In addition to abolishing the OTS, Dodd-Frank creates the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which will have 
the power “under Federal consumer financial law to administer, 
enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal 
consumer financial law,” and to “prescribe rules and issue orders 
and guidance . . . to administer and carry out the purposes and 
objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent 
evasions thereof.”265  This rulemaking authority gives the CFPB 
broad powers, since the “Federal consumer financial laws” it 
oversees include not only the CFP Act, but also broad swaths of 
the consumer law affecting borrowers, such as the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act of 1994, and the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act of 1974.266  Moreover, the consumer financial 
protection functions of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
the OCC, and the OTS are all largely transferred to the CFPB, 
with other regulators retaining examination and enforcement 
powers for smaller financial institutions.267  This transfer of 
much of the consumer protection function will make it more 
difficult for the OCC to argue that consumer protection 
provisions of state law are preempted by OCC regulation. 
Next, Dodd-Frank reverses the field preemption claims of 
OTS regulation and the effective field preemption of OCC 
regulation,268 and instead provides that state consumer financial 
laws are preempted by national banks, thrift laws, and 
regulations only in three circumstances: (1) if the state consumer 
financial law would have a “discriminatory effect on national 
banks” compared to state chartered banks, (2) if “in accordance 
with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank . . . the 
State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes 
with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” and if (3) 
 
 264 Id. at § 1041(a)(2) (“For purposes of this subsection, a statute, regulation, order, or 
interpretation in effect in any State is not inconsistent with the provisions of this title if 
the protection that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords to consumers 
is greater than the protection provided under this title.”). 
 265 Id. at § 1022(a)–(b). 
 266 Id. at § 1002(12). 
 267 Id. at § 1061(b). 
 268 Id. at§ 1044(a). 
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“the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of 
Federal law other than this title.”269  State laws regulating 
residential mortgage servicers should necessarily be “state 
consumer financial laws” given the definition of that term in 
Dodd-Frank.270 
Both the text of Dodd-Frank itself and its legislative history 
signal the return to the Barnett “prevent or significantly 
interfere” standard.  Not only does the text directly cite the 
Barnett standard, but Dodd-Frank was specifically amended to 
include that standard, as a colloquy on the record between 
Senator Dodd and the senator who proposed the amendment 
shortly before passage of Dodd-Frank makes clear.271  Moreover, 
Congress rejected efforts to substitute the Barnett standard with 
the more wide-ranging preemption standard that would have 
preempted any state law that merely “hampered” or “impaired” a 
bank’s powers under the National Bank Act.272 
Dodd-Frank not only rolls back the preemption standard, it 
also makes it much more onerous and difficult for the 
Comptroller of the Currency to claim extensive powers of 
preemption over state consumer financial law, setting up a series 
of hurdles that the OCC must clear to preempt state law.  Dodd-
Frank mandates that preemption determinations “may be made 
by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the 
Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable 
law.”273  Thus, the statute explicitly provides courts with the 
power to make preemption determinations and limits the 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 According to Dodd-Frank, “The term ‘State consumer financial law’ means a State 
law that does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and that 
directly and specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any 
financial transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage in), or any 
account related thereto, with respect to a consumer.” Id. at § 5136C(a)(2). 
 271 See 156 CONG. REC. S5902 (July 15, 2010), in which after Senator Carper notes 
with pleasure that his amendment regarding preemption standards was retained “with 
only minor modifications” by the conference committee, and that his reading of the then 
current language “indicates that the conference report still maintains the Barnett 
standard for determining when a State law is preempted,” Senator Dodd replies that 
Senator Carper is correct and “[t]hat is why the conference report specifically cites the 
Barnett . . . case.  There should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption 
standard stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case.” See discussion of this point in 
Hamburger, supra note 255, at 11–12. 
 272 As noted by Lauren Saunders, “Congress did not adopt an amendment by Rep. 
Bean that would have preempted a state law that ‘impairs, or hampers’ the business of 
banking.  Amendment 141 to H.R. 4173 at 6 (Offered by Rep. Bean Dec. 9, 2009).” LAUREN 
SAUNDERS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 6 (2010), 
available at: http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf. 
 273 Dodd-Frank § 1044(a). 
Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:22 PM 
2011]  Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab 221 
Comptroller of the Currency to making case-by-case 
determinations, rather than engaging in blanket preemption 
determinations as the OCC and OTS had previously done.  Even 
if the Comptroller determines that one state’s law is 
substantially similar to another state’s law that the Comptroller 
has already decided is preempted, the Comptroller must consult 
with the newly established Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection to seek its views regarding whether to extend such 
preemption to the additional state’s law.274 
The CFP Act forces the Comptroller of the Currency to make 
the preemption determination personally, and can no longer 
delegate such determinations to a subordinate, such as the OCC’s 
chief counsel, who had written a series of interpretive letters 
stating that various state laws were preempted.275  Furthermore, 
no preemption finding of the Comptroller shall be valid “unless 
substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding, 
supports the specific finding.”276  Rather than merely issuing 
preemption determinations based on its own judgment, the OCC 
is required to hold some sort of proceeding, keep a record, and 
admit “substantial evidence” supporting each such 
determination.277 
Dodd-Frank also changes the standard of deference courts 
apply to any OCC determination of preemption.278  Rather than 
the deferential Chevron standard, asking if there is a rational 
basis for the agency’s determination, instead, a court reviewing 
an OCC finding of preemption is directed to assess “the validity 
of such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness 
evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the 
reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid 
determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the 
court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.”279  In essence, 
this directs courts to use the less deferential Skidmore standard 
in determining what weight to give agency determinations of the 
preemption of its regulations.280  Dodd-Frank overrules the 
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primary holding of the Watters case by mandating that state law 
apply to subsidiaries of national banks to the same extent such 
law would apply to other business entities subject to state law, 
unless the subsidiaries are also national banks.281 
Dodd-Frank also protects the powers of states, through their 
Attorneys General, to enforce applicable state laws even against 
national banks and thrifts, explicitly codifying the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn.282  In other 
words, the OCC’s visitorial powers to supervise national banks 
and thrifts cannot be seen as preempting the power of states’ 
Attorneys General to sue those financial institutions and seek 
discovery during such litigation.  Furthermore, state Attorneys 
General can sue national banks and thrifts to enforce regulations 
made by the CFPB pursuant to the Act.283  The power of private 
parties to enforce applicable state and federal law is also 
explicitly protected.284 
The CFP Act does provide a protection from the new 
preemption rules for any contract entered into before its 
enactment, with the idea that national banks and thrifts should 
not immediately have all existing contracts overturned based on 
the new preemption rules.285  However, it is difficult to see how 
such a grandfather clause can be applied to mortgage servicers, 
where these consumer contracts can last for thirty years.  Such a 
rule might leave states free to regulate servicers, but only as to 
newer loans, which seems to be an unworkable system, and one 
unintended in the drafting of Dodd-Frank.  Much of the state 
regulation of servicers would affect their operations as a whole, 
rather than address specific loans.  And it would make little 
sense to have the borrowers who need servicer regulation the 
most, those who were the victims of the subprime boom and 
meltdown, be given fewer protections from servicer abuse than 
newer borrowers.  Also, if the grandfathering of contracts 
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included the servicing of contracts, servicers would be loath to 
modify existing loans for fear of losing their grandfathered 
preemption protection. 
The OCC has responded to the preemption changes in Dodd-
Frank by acknowledging that the preemption landscape has 
changed, while at the same time attempting, it seems, to 
minimize those changes.286  In an interpretive letter, the OCC’s 
Acting Comptroller stated that the OCC planned to rescind its 
regulations extending preemption to bank subsidiaries.  The 
Acting Comptroller disingenuously claims that the OCC’s 
regulations purporting to preempt any state law that would 
“obstruct, impair, or condition” national bank powers were 
merely “the OCC’s effort to distill principles from Barnett and 
cases cited in Barnett into an abbreviated regulatory standard,” 
even though the regulations clearly were designed to expand 
preemption far beyond the Barnett standard.287  However, 
according to the letter, the OCC plans to remove the “obstruct, 
impair, or condition” standard from its regulations in order to 
conform to Barnett.  However, the OCC appears ready to fight a 
rear-guard action to preserve its expanded preemption claims, 
arguing that Dodd-Frank’s requirement that the Comptroller 
make preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis should 
not be applied retroactively so as to “overturn existing precedent 
and regulations,” an argument that seems designed to defend as 
much as possible the OCC’s pre-Dodd-Frank regulation.288   
The OCC has followed up with a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPR) that attempts to resist some of the 
preemption changes mandated by Dodd-Frank.289  The OCC 
admits in its commentary to the NPR that its regulation claiming 
preemption for any state law that would “obstruct, impair, or 
condition” is no longer valid and must be withdrawn.290  At the 
same time, the OCC makes the odd claim that existing court 
precedent based on the withdrawn language is still valid because 
“[t]his language was drawn from an amalgam of prior 
precedents . . . . To the extent any existing precedent cited those 
terms in our regulations, that precedent remains valid, since the 
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regulations were premised on principles drawn from the Barnett 
case.”291  In other words, the OCC is attempting to preserve its 
discredited preemption rule by insisting that the precedent it 
created is still valid.  The OCC should have made a sweeping re-
write of its preemption regulations and revisit its previous 
preemption claims, pursuant to the new marching orders under 
Dodd-Frank.  However, its NPR does not contain such a 
widespread re-write, and instead appears to constitute a claim 
that Dodd-Frank did little to alter the preemption landscape for 
federal bank and thrift regulation.  The OCC will not give ground 
easily on preemption, it appears, even in the face of Dodd-Frank. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Dodd-Frank is designed to be a dramatic curb 
on the power of federal agencies, and specifically the OCC, to 
preempt state law even when it comes to national banks.  By 
rolling preemption back to the Barnett standard, Dodd-Frank 
undoes the OCC’s and the OTS’s efforts to obtain Chevron 
deference for their insistence that their regulations occupy the 
field or virtually occupy the field regarding their regulated 
financial institutions. 
The question remains, however, what the states can do with 
this regained power.  While preemption has been rolled back, it 
has not been eliminated.  Tellingly, the OCC retains visitorial 
power, by far the greatest regulatory power, because visitorial 
power allows the OCC to demand to see the banks’ books without 
having to file a lawsuit to do so.292  At the same time, much that 
had been preempted should now be fair game again.  To the 
extent that states are enforcing the kind of existing best practices 
and servicing standards that are already contemplated in the 
FTC’s settlements with rogue servicers or in HAMP, it is hard to 
see how banks or the OCC can claim that such state regulation 
would “prevent or significantly interfere” with a national banks’ 
exercise of its powers, under the Barnett standard for 
preemption.293  Similarly, given the longstanding state regulation 
of debt collection and foreclosure, the two most important duties 
of a mortgage servicer, it is difficult to see how, absent aggressive 
OCC and OTS preemption regulations, a court would conclude 
that servicer regulation was preempted.  Now that the financial 
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consumer protection aspects of OCC and OTS regulation have by 
and large been transferred away from them, their powers to 
preempt state consumer protection in the area of mortgage 
servicing should be minimal.  State officials should find national 
banks and thrifts much more willing to cooperate with them, 
even if informally, for fear that a state Attorney General might 
bring suit. 
Given the lack of federal standards, and the go-ahead from 
Dodd-Frank, the best strategy by states could well be to plow 
forward with effective servicer regulation.  While we are in the 
midst of a mortgage foreclosure crisis, this is no time for 
continued dithering and half measures.  States should assert 
their right to control their own foreclosure processes, and to 
demand whatever steps they deem appropriate in those 
processes, including mediation.  States should enact best 
practices standards for mortgage servicers in the state, and 
argue that such best practices standards should not be 
preempted because they should not, under the Barnett standard, 
“prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s 
exercise of its powers.”294 
It will take federal regulators some time to prepare the 
regulations called for under Dodd-Frank.  It will take courts 
longer to determine the contours of the new banking law 
preemption rules.  However, given that the mortgage crisis is 
ongoing, states, especially those that are bearing the brunt of 
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